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RECOGNITION OF THE NATIONAL 
FOOTBALL LEAGUE AS A SINGLE 
ENTITY UNDER SECTION 1 OF THE 
SHERMAN ACT: IMPLICATIONS 
OF THE CONSUMER WELFARE MODEL 
Myron C Grauer* 
In two recent antitrust actions against the National Football 
League (NFL), Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL 
(the Oakland Raiders case),1 and North American Soccer League v. 
NFL (theNASL case),2 the teams of the NFL were held to be sepa-
rate entities capable of conspiring to violate section 1 of the Sherman 
Act3 when deciding how the NFL should operate. In the Oakland 
Raiders case, the district court judge's holding that the NFL teams 
were separate entities meant that the Los Angeles Memorial Coli-
seum Commission and the Oakland Raiders could continue to prose-
cute their section 1 claim. This claim was based on an allegation 
that League members were engaged in an illegal conspiracy in at-
tempting to prohibit the movement of the Raiders' franchise from 
Oakland to Los Angeles.4 In the NASL case, the Second Circuit 
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1. 519 F. Supp. 581 (C.D. Cal. 1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-5572 (9th Cir. June 14, 
1982). This case will be referred to as the Oakland Raiders case because the Oakland Raiders 
club is a cross-claimant against the NFL and the suit has received much publicity growing out 
of the Oakland Raiders' move from Oakland to Los Angeles. Indeed, scholarly co=ent on 
the litigation in this case is already beginning to appear. See, e.g., Kurlantzick, Thoughts on 
Professional Sports and The Antitrust Laws: Las Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. 
National Football League, 15 CONN. L. REV. 183 (1983). 
2. 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 499 (1982). 
3. Section l of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination 
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or co=erce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § l (1982). 
4. See Kurlantzick, supra note l, at 184. The conspiracy allegation in this suit was based 
on NFL CONST. AND BY-LAWS art. IV, § 4.3 (Supp. 1982), which states: 
The League shall have exclusive control of the exhibition of football games by member 
clubs within the home territory of each member. No member club shall have the right to 
transfer its franchise or playing site to a different city, either within or outside its home 
1 
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Court of Appeals' conclusion that the NFL teams were separate enti-
ties led it to enjoin the NFL from amending its constitution to add a 
cross-ownership ban, on the ground that this would be a conspiracy 
in violation of section 1.5 The cross-ownership ban would have pro-
hibited an owner of an NFL team from owning any interest in a 
team in another major professional sport such as hockey, baseball, 
basketball or soccer.6 
In reaching these results, both courts misused precedent and 
failed to understand what policy should underlie the antitrust laws. 
The Supreme Court missed a golden opportunity to correct some of 
these errors when it denied the NFL's petition for certiorari in the 
NASL case.7 Justice Rehnquist recognized the error that the Court 
was making and filed an opinion dissenting from the denial of certi-
orari. 8 He noted that the NFL is a joint venture that produces a 
product (NFL football) that each of its teams could not produce in-
dependently.9 He further observed that the NFL "competes with 
other sports and other forms of entertainment in the entertainment 
market."10 Analogizing a NFL team owner's knowledge of NFL op-
erations to a business employee's knowledge of trade secrets, 11 Jus-
tice Rehnquist concluded that a cross-ownership ban could be 
upheld as similar to a covenant not to compete that is intended to 
protect trade secrets.12 Drawing a parallel to an enterprise familiar 
to most lawyers, he stated: "I cannot believe the Court of Appeals 
would expect a law firm to countenance its partners working part-
time at a competing firm while remaining partners." 13 As a result, 
Justice Rehnquist could not discern why a ban on cross-ownership 
by NFL owners would be impermissible.14 
This article argues that Justice Rehnquist has analyzed the oper-
ational structure of the NFL in a manner that is consistent with 
proper antitrust enforcement policy, and expands upon the view that 
territory, without prior approval by the affirmative vote of three-fourths of the existing 
member clubs of the League. 
5. 670 F.2d at 1256-61. 
6. NFL CONST. AND BY-LAWS art. IX, § 9.4 (Proposed 1978), reprinted in NASL, 670 F.2d 
1249, 1255 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 499 (1982). 
7. 103 S. Ct. 499 (1982). 
8. 103 S. Ct. 499, 499 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
9. 103 S. Ct. at 500-01 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
10. 103 S. Ct. at 500 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
11. 103 S. Ct. at 501 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
12. 103 S. Ct. at 501 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
13. 103 S. Ct. at 501 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
14. 103 S. Ct. at 502 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).' 
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he espoused. It contends that the NFL is analogous to a law firm 
partnership, with the teams analogous to departments or partners 
that can make operating rules for the firm without fear of violating 
section 1 of the Sherman Act. 15 In arriving at the opposite conclu-
sion, both the Oakland Raiders and NASL courts relied on several 
cases involving player restraints16 that presupposed that teams in 
15. See note 22 infra and accompanying text; Part III infra. 
16. Player restraints include, for example, the draft, the "No-Tampering Rule," and the 
"Rozelle Rule." NFL CONST. AND BY-LAWS art. XIV (1976 & Supp. 1982), entitled "Selection 
Meeting,'' provides for an annual draft of players who have recently satisfied the eligibility 
requirements for playing in the NFL. Under article XIV, each NFL team, beginning with the 
team with the worst record in the previous season and ending with the team with the best 
record, picks one player. Once each team has chosen one player, the process is repeated in 
subsequent rounds. Permitting the team with the worst record to choose first is intended to 
help strengthen the weaker teams in order to promote competitive balance on the playing field. 
See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1175-76 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Once a player is 
drafted by a team, he is placed on that team's Selection and Reserve lists. See NFL CONST. 
AND BY-LAWS art. XIV, § 14.5 (1976). This draft system is essentially the same as the 1968 
draft that was held to violate section 1 of the Sherman Act in Smith. Compare NFL CONST. 
AND BY-LAWS art. XIV (1976 & Supp. 1982) with Smith, 593 F.2d at 1175 (description of 1968 
NFL player-draft procedures). 
NFL CONST. AND BY-LAWS art. IX, § 9.2 (Supp. 1982), commonly referred to as the No-
Tampering Rule, prohibits a team from negotiating with or making an offer to a player who is 
on the active, reserve, or selection list of any other team. 
NFL CONST. AND BY-LAWS art. XII,§ 12.J(H) (1976), commonly referred to as the Rozelle 
Rule, was successfully challenged in a section 1 action in Mackey v. National Football League, 
543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), ·cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). The Mackey court suc-
cinctly described the Rozelle Rule as follows: 
The Rozelle Rule essentially provides that when a player's contractual obligation to a 
team expires and he signs with a different club, the signing club must provide compensa-
tion to the player's former team. If the two clubs are unable to conclude mutually satis-
factory arrangements, the Commissioner may award compensation in the form of one or 
more players and/or draft choices as he deems fair and equitable. 
543 F.2d at 609 n.l. The Rozelle Rule's compensation provision has been described as having 
an in terrorem effect on teams thinking of signing free agents. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 
F.2d 1173, 1176 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In combination, the draft, No-Tampering Rule, and 
Rozelle Rule effectively precluded a player from being able to play for the team that was 
willing to make him the best offer. 
After the player draft and the Rozelle Rule were invalidated in the Smith and Mackey 
cases, respectively, the NFL and the National Football League Players Association entered 
into a collective bargaining agreement that provided for an amended, but substantially similar, 
draft and Rozelle Rule. See Roberts & Powers, .Defining the Relationship between Antitrust Law 
and Labor Law: Professional Sports and the Current Legal Battleground, 19 WM. & MARYL. 
REv. 395, 449-50 (1978). As pan of a bona fide negotiated collective bargaining agreement, 
the new draft and Rozelle Rule may now be immune from antitrust challenge under the ra-
tionale of McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979) (reserve system 
incorporated in agreement between National Hockey League and National Hockey League 
Players Association as a result of good faith, arm's length bargaining was entitled to non-
statutory labor exemption from antitrust laws). The collectively bargained changes in the draft 
and Rozelle Rule, and the fact that they may now be exempt from antitrust challenge under 
Mccourt, are immaterial to this Article because this Article contends that the draft and Ro-
zelle Rule challenged in Smith and Mackey should not have been held to violate section 1 of 
the Sherman Act. See Part IV infra. 
For a discussion of the changes in the player draft and Rozelle Rule brought about by the 
subsequent collective bargaining agreement, see Rothenberg & Tellem, Restraints on Profes-
sional Athletes, 4 L.A. LAW. 35, 48 (June, 1981); Roberts & Powers, supra, at 449-50. 
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professional •sports leagues, such as the NFL, are separate entities 
capable of an intra league conspiracy violating section 1.17 The Oak-
land Raiders and NASL courts reasoned that if the NFL teams are 
separate entities in some section 1 actions, such as player-restraint 
cases, they must be separate entities in all section 1 actions. 18 How-
ever, both courts improperly relied upon the player-restraint cases 
because, as detailed below, 19 a reexamination of the antitrust issues 
raised in the player-restraint cases undermines their precedential 
value.20 
The following hypothetical should help place the player-restraint 
cases in their proper perspective. Suppose an ambitious young attor-
ney who worked in a major national law firm was dissatisfied with 
the manner in which he and his fellow associates were assigned to 
the different departments and were compensated. As a result, he 
asked that each department (such as labor or tax) be required to bid 
at the end of each fiscal year for the services of the various associ-
ates. Under his proposal, each associate could choose to work dur-
ing the following year for the department that made the most 
attractive offer. The partners denied the young attorney's request, 
realizing that, if implemented, his proposal could have devastating 
effects on the firm. Teams working on litigation matters would be 
broken up and restructured at the end of each fiscal year. A depart-
ment that had an exceptionally lucrative, intellectually interesting, or 
otherwise successful practice could become the dominant depart-
ment in the firm by acquiring all the star associates. In short, such 
an internal system of assigning and compensating associates would 
make the firm operate inefficiently and would inhibit the firm's ef-
forts to succeed as a full-service law firm. 
Regardless of these considerations, suppose the young attorney 
then brought an action against the firm under section 1 of the Sher-
man Act, alleging that the partners had conspired to fix the associ-
17. See NASL, 610 F.2d at 1257 (citing Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); 
Linseman v. World Hockey Association, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977); Bowman v. NFL, 
402 F. Supp. 754 (D. Minn. 1975); Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), affd. on 
other grounds, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979)); Oakland Raid-
ers, 519 F. Supp. at 583 (citing Smith, Mackey, and Kapp). 
18. NASL, 610 F.2d at 1256-57; Oakland Raiders, 519 F. Supp. at 583. 
19. See Part IV infra. 
20. Twelve years ago, Jacobs and Winter declared that the issue of whether player re-
straints violate the antitrust laws "is an issue whose time has come and gone, an issue which 
has suffered that modem fate worse than death: irrelevancy." Jacobs & Winter,Antitrost Prin-
ciples and Collective Bargaining By Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. I, I 
(1971). However, because of their use in non-player-restraint Oakland Raiders and NASL 
cases, the antitrust issues of the player-restraint cases must be reexamined. 
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ates' salaries and thus · effectively engaged in a group boycott by 
refusing to permit associates to move from department to depart-
ment at the end of each fiscal year. Three things would probably 
happen, though not necessarily in this order: (1) the associate would 
be fired, (2) the associate would be committed to a mental institu-
tion, and (3) the suit would be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 
The suit would fail to state a claim because section 1 of the Sherman 
Act requires more than one actor for a violation to occur.21 When 
operating decisions are made within a partnership or other business 
entity, the only person deemed to be acting is the business entity 
itself. The individuals who comprise the business entity are not 
deemed to be the multiple actors needed for a section 1 violation. 22 
Because the NFL is analogous to a law firm, 23 any section 1 ac-
tion brought against only the NFL or the NFL and its member 
teams, regardless of who brings it (be it players, member teams, or 
competing entertainment ventures), should be dismissed as summa-
rily as the suit by our demented young law firm associate.24 To 
demonstrate this position, this article will: (1) briefly explain the 
21. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST, § 108, at 311 (1977) ("Section I 
can be violated only by two [or more] separate entities acting in concert, by a 'contract, combi-
nation or conspiracy' in restraint of trade."). 
22. See, e.g., Joseph E. Seagram and Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 
71, 80-84 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970); Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. 
Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953); San Fran-
cisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966, 969-70 (C.D. Cal. 1974); see 
also Part II infra. 
23. While this article deals in particula.r with the NFL, many of the arguments presented 
here are equally applicable to other sports leagues. For this reason and because some practices 
engaged in by the NFL and other sports leagues have been challenged under section I only in 
cases involving leagues other than the NFL, non-NFL cases will be used in some instances to 
demonstrate why certain NFL practices should not be deemed section I violations. 
24. After this law firm hypothetical was formulated and drafted, a similar law firm hypo-
thetical from the players' point of view came to the author's attention. This hypothetical anal-
ogizes the players' situation to that which would face law school graduates if all law firms in 
the United States were organized into a National Law Firm League, with each law firm having 
the right to bargain exclusively with those associates selected by it in an associates' draft. See 
Rothenberg & Tellem, supra note 16, at 35, 44. This hypothetical is not, however, analogous to 
the NFL situation. As this article will demonstrate, the NFL should be deemed a single entity 
in part because its component parts, the individual teams, could not produce the ultimate 
product, NFL football, on their own. A decision within the NFL by the teams on how to 
allocate players should therefore be viewed as efficiency producing because it aids in the pro-
duction of the product at the highest possible level of quality, and not as anticompetitive be-
cause the teams in producing this product are not competing against each other economically 
any more than are the partners witliin one law firm. 
A draft by a National Law Firm League, on the other hand, would be purely anticompeti-
tive because each member firm can and does produce its own product (legal services) indepen-
dently of the other league members, and each member law firm competes economically against 
other members. Such a National Law Firm League draft, therefore, would operate solely to 
eliminate competition for legal talent, which is a key area of competition between law firms in 
their quest for economic superiotjty. A National Law Firm League draft is more properly 
analogized to a co=on draft held by the NFL and the new United States Football League 
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concept of consumer wealth maximization and illustrate why it is the 
only proper goal of antitrust enforcement policy; (2) describe and 
analyze the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine, concluding that 
courts should look to the economic substance of enterprise arrange-
ments rather than their legal form; (3) demonstrate that the NFL, 
with the teams as partners (or law firm departments), is closely 
analogous to a law firm partnership, and thus should be deemed a 
single entity for purposes of section 1 of the Sherman Act; ( 4) discuss 
why the player-restraint cases, which treat the NFL teams as eco-
nomically competing multiple entities for section I purposes, were 
improperly decided; and (5) show that the Oakland Raiders and 
NASL decisions are inconsistent with the proper goal of antitrust 
policy and that several of the non-player-restraint cases on which 
they rely are either theoretically unsound or improperly cited. 
This Article does not contend that the NFL or any other sports 
league should be exempt from the antitrust laws, nor does it argue 
that the NFL should be immune from section 1 liability and there-
fore be free to combine with other entities to restrain competition. It 
simply argues that the NFL is a single entity for section I purposes. 
Furthermore, this Article does not contend that the NFL should be 
immune from section 225 liability and be permitted to engage in 
predatory practices against competing entertainment entities. 
Rather, the Article's position is consistent with the following com-
ment made by Professor (now Judge) Bork before most of the cases 
discussed in this Article were decided: 
We allow partnerships and their ancillary restraints, but the restraint 
ceases to be ancillary when two separate partnerships agree on the 
prices they will charge. Perhaps the Court should view the league as a 
firm and validate all its internal restraints on competition, but it is diffi-
cult to see why two leagues should be allowed to have a common 
player draft and a reserve clause that operates between the leagues as 
well as within them. Competition between leagues should be free. 
That solution may not please either the owners or the players, but it is 
consistent with antitrust principles. Sooner or later the Court is going 
to have to face the issues raised by the restraints in organized sports, 
and this solution seems to me dictated by the needs of leagues and by 
(USFL). Because the NFL and USFL are two economic competitors, such a common draft 
could very well be open to a successful challenge under section I of the Sherman Act. 
25. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides: 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire 
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed" guilty of a felony, and, 
on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a 
corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment 
not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. · 
15 u.s.c. § 2 (1982). 
October 1983) NFL and Section I of the Sherman Act 
the analogy of the league to partnerships or firms.26 
I. CONSUMER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION: THE ONLY PROPER 
GOAL OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY 
7 
For almost two decades, commentators have debated the proper 
goals of the antitrust laws. On one side are those who view the anti-
trust laws as intended to promote multiple goals, including economic 
efficiency and individual liberty.27 Proponents of this view contend 
that individual liberty is enhanced by limiting the size and power 
obtainable by any entity and by promoting the existence of many 
small rival entities. On the other side are those who see the promo-
tion of consumer wealth maximization through economic efficiency 
as the only proper goal of antitrust policy.28 This article sides with 
the latter position. Before explaining why it does so, however, it is 
necessary to digress momentarily to explain the concept of consumer 
wealth maximization. 
A. The Concept of Consumer Wealth Maximization 29 
The concept of consumer wealth maximization, also known as 
Pareto optimality after the economist Vilfredo Pareto, 30 is based 
upon several assumptions, and postulates a goal for any society. 
Pareto optimality assumes that society contains limited resources, 
that consumers as a whole desire as many goods and services as they 
can obtain at the lowest possible price, and that producers desire to 
maximize profits. The goal of Pareto optimality is to allocate soci-
ety's limited resources in a manner such that no rearrangement of 
those resources (by judicial decree or otherwise) can make any one 
26. Debate-Resolved· Present Antitrust Restraints On Pricing Should Be Relaxed, 41 
A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 5, 13 (1971) (quoting Bork giving the First Affirmative). 
27. See, e.g., Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 CouJM. L. REV. 377 (1965); Red-
lich, The Burger Court And The Per Se Rule, 44 ALB. L. REV. I (1979); Sullivan, Economics 
And More Humanistic Disciplines: What Are The Sources Of Wisdom For Antitrust?, 125 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1214 (1977). 
28. See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 57 (1978); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: 
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 4 (1976); Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman 
Act, 9 J. LAW & EcoN. 7 (1966) (hereinafter cited as Bork, Legislative Intent); Bork, The Rule 
of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Prire Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965) 
(pt. 1), 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966) (pt. 2) [hereinafter cited as Bork, The Rule of Reason]; Posner, 
The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1, 13 (1977). 
29. This discussion of the concept of consumer wealth maximization is derived from R. 
BORK, supra note 28, at 58-62, 91-129; R. DORFMAN, PRICES AND MARKETS 174-76 (3d ed. 
1978); and Bork, The Rule of Reason (pt. 2), supra note 28, at 466-67. 
30. To see how the terms "Pareto optimality" or "Pareto criterion" and "consumer wealth 
maximization" or ~•consumer, welfare" can be used interchangeably, compare R. BORK, supra 
note 28, at 90-91, with R. DORFMAN, supra note 29, at 174-75. 
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person better off ( or more satisfied) without making another person 
worse off. This, of course, does not mean that each person should be 
able to get whatever he or she pleases. Rather, each person's ability 
to get what he or she pleases is limited by the scarcity of resources 
and the desires of others. In any event, Pareto optimality is an unat-
tainable goal because a society's economy is dynamic (i.e., always in 
a state of flux rather than static) and because the perfect free-market 
economy does not exist. Nevertheless, Pareto optimality, like Ham-
let's vision of death as a peaceful end to the traumas of life, is "a 
consummation [d]evoutly to be wisht."31 
Producers can seek to maximize profits in one of two ways: (1) by 
behaving efficiently in order to produce as many goods and services 
as possible at the lowest possible price; or (2) by gaining monopoly 
power and restricting output,32 thus enabling them to raise prices 
because the demand exceeds the restricted output or supply.33 The 
monopolist who restricts output and raises prices quite likely im-
pedes the quest for Pareto optimality because his actions may pre-
vent consumers as a whole from obtaining as many goods and 
services as they desire at the lowest possible price. On the other 
hand, the businessman who operates efficiently will aid society in its 
quest to attain the consumer welfare goal of providing the most 
goods at the lowest possible price. 
In a free-market economy, the most efficient firm will generally 
be the one patronized by consumers, and its attempts at attaining 
efficiency should not be thwarted by the courts. The firm that re-
stricts output, however, generally damages consumer welfare and 
should be the target of the antitrust laws. Thus, those who view 
maximization of consumer welfare as the sole goal of antitrust policy 
31. 8 THE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE 287 (New York: Duffield & Company, 1906) 
(Hamlet, Act III, Scene I, Lines 63-64). 
32. Bork actually contends that there is a third way by which a business can seek to maxi-
mize profits, viz., "by some device not related to either production or allocative efficiency, such 
as taking advantage of some wrinkle in the tax laws (neutral)." R. BORK, supra note 28, at 122. 
Bork believes that such neutral actions should be upheld as legal. Id. These neutral actions, 
however, could better be described as responses to efficiency reducing externalities (for exam-
ple, taxes) that are built into the system and must, therefore, be tolerated. For example, the 
time and costs involved in determining how to take advantage of a wrinkle in the tax laws 
represents an inefficient allocation of resources that is required by the externality of taxes. 
This externality would not be present in a perfect free-market economy. When viewed as 
responses to accepted externalities, these neutral actions should drop out of the list of practices 
that should be examined in antitrust inquiries. Thus, for antitrust purposes, there are only two 
ways by which producers seek to maximize profits. 
33. A business entity acting in its self-interest would not restrict output before it gained 
monopoly power, because if it tried to raise prices to reap profits from its output restriction 
before obtaining monopoly power, consumers would simply take their business to competing 
businesses that were not restricting output and that could thus afford to offer lower prices. 
October 1983] NFL and Section 1 of the Sherman Act 9 
define competition as a goal that consists of the Pareto optimal state. 
Under this view, a court's role is to determine if an action is intended 
to restrict output or promote efficiency.34 If an action is not intended 
to restrict output, it must be intended to promote efficiency, and 
therefore should be upheld. The converse of this statement, namely, 
"If an activity is intended to promote efficiency, it is not output re-
strictive and must be upheld," is not necessarily true. As Bork notes, 
there are certain mixed cases in which an activity can both produce 
efficiencies and restrict output. Bork adds, however, that this situa-
tion rarely arises outside of the context of a horizontal merger.35 Be-
cause this article does not deal with cases involving horizontal 
mergers, we shall assume that if an activity is intended to promote 
efficiency, it is not output restrictive and should be upheld. 
This does not mean that an activity or practice must succeed in 
producing the intended efficiencies for it to be upheld. Consumer 
wealth maximization theory assumes that consumers will make ra-
tional decisions based upon what is best for them, and if a business is 
not acting efficiently enough to succeed vis-a-vis its competitors, it 
will either adjust its operations or lose its customers. Therefore, 
when consumers have the freedom to choose among producers, and 
producers continually adjust their practices via trial and error to sat-
isfy consumer demands, Pareto optimality or consumer wealth max-
imization is approached. Consequently, courts should not interfere 
with unilateral decisions on how a business should operate unless the 
business possesses monopoly power and the questioned practices are 
intended to restrict output. Judicial interference with practices that 
are not aimed at restricting output and that are therefore attempts to 
promote efficiency will quite likely interfere with the dynamics of the 
market place and produce anticompetitive effects. 
B. Why Consumer Wealth Maximization Is The Only Proper Goal 
Of Antitrust Enforcement Policy 
Scholars generally agree that the legislative history of the Sher-
man Act is so vague that no single underlying enforcement policy 
34. A firm does not intend to operate efficiently or, alternatively, restrict output for its own 
sake, but only as, a means to maximize profits. Thus, properly speaking, it might be more 
accurate to Say that a court should inquire whether a firm is seeking to maximize profits by 
restricting output, or whether it is seeking to accomplish this end by operating efficiently. In 
this sense, enterprise actions are not intended to restrict output or promote efficiency; they are 
intended to maximize profits. However, because the goal of profit-maximization can be at-
tained either through output restriction (if the business is a monopoly) or efficient operation, 
courts must determine which approach is being used when a firm takes a particular action. 
35. See R. BORK, supra note 28, at 122-24. 
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can be derived from it and that several possible enforcement policies 
can be found in the congressional debates leading to its enactment.36 
Indeed, Judge Bork originally espoused this view37 but later at-
tempted to prove that consumer wealth maximization can be found 
as the sole underlying policy of the Sherman Act simply by examin-
ing the Act's legislative history.38 Professor Elzinga, who generally 
agrees with Bork's antitrust philosophy, has described Bork's posi-
tion as "ingenious and appealing, not only because of the pristine 
conclusion it reaches. But like King Agrippa after hearing the Apos-
tle Paul, one remains only 'almost persuaded.' "39 One may be "only 
'almost persuaded' " by Bork's argument that the legislative history 
proves that consumer welfarism is the sole goal of the Sherman Act. 
However, Bork's arguments that consumer welfarism should be the 
sole goal of antitrust policy, which are based on more than simply 
the legislative history, are convincing. 
Although Bork has devoted much of his scholarly research to lo-
cating an implied policy of consumer wealth maximization in many 
of the early antitrust cases,40 his presentation of the advantages of 
having consumer wealth maximization as the sole goal of the anti-
trust laws is his most persuasive argument.41 Furnishing businesses 
with objective legal standards is the primary advantage of such an 
approach. For businesses to operate effectively, they must be able to 
predict the legal consequences of their actions. Therefore, objective 
legal standards are as badly needed in antitrust as in any other 
field.42 Since the antitrust laws are intended to promote competi-
36. See, e.g., Blake & Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 CoLUM, L. 
R.Ev. 422, 422-23 (1965); Elzinga, The Goals Of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Effi-
ciency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 1191, 1191-92 & n.2 (1977); Sullivan, supra note 
27, at 1218. 
37. See Bork, The Rule of Reason (pt. 1), supra note 28, at 783. 
38. See Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 28. 
39. Elzinga, supra note 36, at 1192 n.2. 
40. See Bork, The Rule of Reason (pts. 1 & 2), supra note 28. 
41. See R. BORK, supra note 28, at 81-89; Bork, The Rule of Reason (pt. I), supra note 28, 
at 833-47. 
42. As Bork has stated: 
No businessman can know what the law is if the "law" depends upon the sympathies and 
prejudices of any one of the hundreds of federal judges before whom he may find himself 
arraigned at some uncertain date in the future. He can know what the law is when the 
goal of the law is consumer welfare, because the major distinctions of such a system run 
along the same lines in which the businessman thinks, making lawful his attempts to be 
more efficient and making unlawful his attempts to remove rivalry through such improper 
means as cartelization, monopolistic merger, and deliberate predation. A consumer-wel-
fare goal, moreover, lends itself to relatively few and simple rules of substantive law, so 
that predictability is further enhanced. . . . Finally, a consumer welfare orientation 
makes change in the law predictable and less likely to produce unfairness. ' 
R. BORK, supra note 28, at 81. 
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tion, such objective standards are best found in economic analysis. 
If the objective standards were derived elsewhere, anticompetitive 
results might be reached.43 The Supreme Court apparently now 
agrees that objective standards must be derived from economic anal-
ysis, because it has stated: "[A]n antitrust policy divorced from mar-
ket considerations would lack any objective benchmarks."44 This 
statement represents a movement away from earlier cases that re-
flected the view that the antitrust laws could and should satisfy more 
than one goal, and toward a recognition that consumer wealth max-
imization should be the sole policy underlying antitrust enforcement. 
The earlier view supporting multiple antitrust goals was ex-
pressed in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,45 a merger action under 
section 7 of the Clayton Act,46 where the Supreme Court stated: 
Of course, some of the results of large integrated or chain operations 
are beneficial to consumers. Their expansion is not rendered unlawful 
by the mere fact that small independent stores may be adversely af-
fected. It is competition, not competitors, which the Act protects. But 
we cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition 
through the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Con-
gress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result 
from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It re-
solved these competing considerations in favor of decentralization. We 
must give effect to that decision.47 
In this statement, the Court asserted that the antitrust laws protect 
competition instead of competitors and implied that efficient actions 
by businesses are not unlawful even if smaller competitors are 
harmed thereby. At the same time, however, it posited that protect-
ing competition includes maintaining small businesses, despite their 
possible inefficiency. By these statements, the Court espoused posi-
tions so inconsistent that a businessman or his attorney could have a 
nervous breakdown while attempting to evaluate the legality of a 
proposed action. 
43. See notes 45-47 infra and accompanying text. An objective standard that promotes the 
protection of small businesses can result in higher costs to the consumer than would be found 
in a Pareto optimal state. That is plainly an anticompetitive result under a consumer wealth 
maximization approach. 
44. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977). 
45. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
46. At th~ time Bror,,n Shoe was decided, Section 7 of the Clayton Act, provided in perti-
nent part:, 
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or 
any pa,rt of the stock 9r otl}er share capital . . . of another corporation engaged also in 
commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such 
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly. 
370 U.S. at 296 (19.62) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18 (amended 1980)). 
47. 370 U.S. at 344. 
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In United States v. Topco Associates ,48 the Court recognized that 
objective legal tests are necessary for businessmen to make intelli-
gent decisions. The Court found these tests in the per se rules. How-
ever, in so doing, the Court implied that economic theory was so 
complex that its use in antitrust cases was incompatible with the 
need for predictability satisfied by the per se rules.49 The Court ad-
mitted the folly of this thinking only seven years later in Continental 
T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. ,50 in the statement already noted 
that "an antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would 
lack any objective benchmarks."51 Indeed, the Sylvania Court went 
on to engage in the types of economic analysis suggested by those 
who believe that consumer wealth maximization is the only proper 
goal of antitrust enforcement policy, and cited Bork and Posner with 
approval.52 Furthermore, the Sylvania Court rejected the Topco po-
sition that the predictability supposedly given by per se rules was 
sufficient to justify their use: 
[P]er se rules tend to provide guidance to the business community and 
to minimize the burdens on litigants and the judicial system of the 
more complex rule-of-reason trials, . . . but those advantages are not 
sufficient in themselves to justify the creation of per se rules. If it were 
otherwise, all of antitrust law would be reduced to per se rules, thus 
introducing an unintended and undesirable rigidity in the law.53 
While the Court has yet to state specifically that antitrust cases 
should be decided simply by determining whether an activity re-
stricts output or is intended to promote efficiencies, the Court has 
intimated that businessmen should be permitted to decide for them-
selves the most efficient method of operation.54 Additionally, the 
Court has stated that the Sherman Act "floor debates . . . suggest 
that Congress designed the Sherman Act as a 'consumer welfare 
prescription.' "55 
48. 405 U.S. 596 (1972) 
49. 405 U.S. at 609-10 & n.10. 
50. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
51. 433 U.S. at 53 n.21; see also note 44 supra and accompanying text. 
52. 433 U.S. at 54-57. 
53. 433 U.S. at 50 n.16 (citation omitted). 
54. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. I (1979). In 
Broadcast Music, the Court was unable to see how ASCAP's requirement that CBS pay "a flat 
fee regardless of the amount of use it made of ASCAP compositions" could constitute an 
antitrust violation inasmuch as " '(s)ound business judgement could indicate that such pay-
ment represents the most convenient method of fixing the business value of the privileges 
granted by the licensing agreement ... .'" 441 U.S. at 8-9 n.13 (quoting Automatic Radio 
Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 834 (1950)). 
55. Reiterv. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (quoting R. BORK, supra note 28, at 
66). 
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The Court has not yet stated that consumer wealth maximization 
should be the sole goal of antitrust enforcement policy, but it has 
traveled quite far along that road. Of course, like most travelers, the 
Court is bound periodically to detour from its path. An unfortunate 
detour recently occurred inArizona v. Maricopa County Medical So-
ciety. 56 In an opinion reminiscent of Topco, the Court refused to 
engage in any economic analysis. Instead, the Court held as per se 
illegal an agreement among physicians on the maximum fees they 
would charge policy holders under certain health insurance plans. 
In a stinging dissent, Justice Powell noted that the Court disregarded 
the potential consumer benefits of a maximum fee schedule and the 
fact that the antitrust laws are intended to promote consumer wel-
fare. 57 Apparently, while the Court when acting rationally now 
views consumer wealth maximization as the proper goal of the anti-
trust laws, some of the Justices58 react to the word "price" as 
Pavlov's dogs did to bells, but, instead of salivating, they lose all 
sense of proportion and shout ''per se !" 
Notwithstanding the Court's recent detour, Bork remains con-
vincing in arguing that unless consumer wealth maximization is the 
sole goal of antitrust enforcement policy, the goal of predictability of 
result will not be achieved and anticompetitive court decisions may 
ensue. Unless consumer welfarism is the only goal of antitrust pol-
icy, social policies inevitably affect each antitrust decision. Conse-
quently, all predictability and hope for consistently pro-competitive 
results are lost because each case will turn on the political and social 
choices of the court deciding it.59 As the Supreme Court is slowly 
56. 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982). 
57. 102 S. Ct. at 2485 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
58. The term "a majority" of the Justices would be inappropriate because Maricopa 
County was a 4-3 decision. Justices Blackmun and O'Connor took no part in the consideration 
of the case. 102 S. Ct. at 2480. 
59. Bork, The Rule of Reason (pt. I), supra note 28, at 838-39. For a cogent analysis of how 
Justice Brandeis' political and social choice of protecting small and potentially inefficient pro-
ducers led to an anticompetitive result in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 
231 (1918), see R. BORK, supra note 28, at 41-47. -
Even a cursory examination of the principal justifications of a multi-dimensional antitrust 
policy reveals serious flaws in that position. Blake and Jones contend that economic efficiency 
could not be the sole goal of antitrust law. They reason that other modem industrial countries 
without similar antitrust laws have higher economic growth rates than the United States, mak-
ing it apparent that considerations other than economic efficiency underlie United States anti-
trust policy. Blake & Jones, supra note 27, at 381-82. However, Blake and Jones fail to 
perceive that lower United States economic growth rates may be due to the American judici-
ary's failure to recognize that the antitrust laws should be intended solely to foster economic 
efficiency, thus leading to the judiciary's failure to apply those laws to achieve this goal. This 
failure is exemplified by the language quoted earlier from Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 
370 U.S. 294 (1962). See text accompanying note 47 supra. The Brown Shoe decision, and 
others like it, could, by misconstruing the proper purpose of the antitrust laws, produce the 
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realizing, only a consumer wealth maximization policy can give pre-
dictability and consistently procompetitive results. The next section 
of this Article will show how this policy should be used to determine 
whether multiple entities exist for purposes of section 1 of the Sher-
man Act. 
II. THE lNTRAENTERPRISE CONSPIRACY DOCTRINE 
A conspiracy cannot exist under section 1 of the Sherman Act 
among the individuals or divisions of one business entity.60 How-
ever, the courts are split on whether mere separate incorporation or 
organization of affiliated or controlled entities makes those separate 
entities capable of conspiring in violation of section 1.61 One view 
same adverse effect on economic growth as any clear congressional statement that the antitrust 
laws serve multiple yet inconsistent policies. 
In a further effort to refute the consumer welfare advocates' position that consumers fare 
best in a free competitive market, Blake and Jones state: "Here at home we do not find that 
economic progress is invariably linked to competitive markets. Monopolized industries such 
as telecommunications and electric power are not regarded as unprogressive." Blake & Jones, 
supra note 27, at 382. This statement fails to recognize that those who advocate consumer 
welfarism as the sole goal of the antitrust laws accept the reality of a dynamic economy and 
the impossibility of a perfect free-market economy due to the presence of certain externalities. 
Consumer welfare advocates also recognize that the efficiencies of some monopolies may out-
weigh any dead-weight loss that they cause. Thus, certain monopolies are tolerated in the 
quest for the unattainable Pareto optimal state. See R. BORK, supra note 28, at 192-95; R. 
DORFMAN, supra note 29, at 156. Furthermore, Blake and Jones' use of the term "monopo-
lized industries" is misleading. It is not "monopolized industies" that society tolerates, but 
rather certain monopolies, for section 2 of the Sherman Act outlaws monopolization but not 
lawfully-obtained monopolies that do not misuse their lawfully-obtained monopoly power. 
See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 21, § 7, at 29-30 (1977) (outlining prohibitions of Sher-
man Act§ 2). 
While Blake and Jones also contend that individual liberty is an antitrust goal, Blake & 
Jones, supra note 27, at 383-84, and cite Senator Sherman's rhetoric for that proposition, Blake 
& Jones, supra note 36, at 422-23, it is Professor Sullivan who tries to justify the multi-goal 
approach by examining the Sherman Act in the context of American history at the time of its 
passage. Sullivan,supra note 27, at 1218-20. Sullivan suggests that when one considers Amer-
ican society during the late 19th century, with all the tensions and ambivalences caused by the 
industrial revolution, it is difficult to expect to find doctrinal purity underlying the Sherman 
Act. Id. at 1219. Sullivan cites R. HOFSTADTER, Whal Happened lo the Anlilrusl Movement?, 
in THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER EsSAYS 233 (1965), as arguing 
persuasively "that antitrust expresses an abiding American conservatism, a perennial Ameri-
can impulse to find ways to divide, limit and diffuse both governmental and non-governmental 
power." Id. Unfortunately, this historical approach to antitrust policy fails to provide aid in 
establishing a workable and predictable legal system. Historians do not have the obligation to 
establish and maintain a workable and predictable legal system. Judges do, however, and 
therefore should not have the luxury of deciding cases based upon their own interpretations of 
history, for history is subject to varying interpretations. Contrast Sullivan's reading of the 
historical record with Bork's use of history to show that promotion of consumer welfare was 
intended to be the sole goal of the antitrust laws. Compare Sullivan, supra note 27, with Bork, 
Legislative Intent, supra note 28. Courts, therefore, should be guided by the need for predict• 
ability in the law coupled with the avoidance of anticompetitive decisions. 
60. See cases cited at note 22 supra. 
61. See Handler & Smart, The Present Status Of The Intracorporale Conspiracy Doctrine, 3 
CARDOZO L. REV. 23, 38-39 (1981). 
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holds that mere separate organization or incorporation ( even of a 
parent and a wholly owned and controlled subsidiary) gives rise to 
the requisite plurality of actors needed for a section 1 violation. 62 
The opposing view analyzes all the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the relationship of the separately organized _entities to de-
termine if, based upon an economically realistic appraisal of those 
facts and circumstances, the requisite plurality of actors is present. 63 
Each view finds support in inconsistent statements by the Supreme 
Court. 
In Perma L!fe Mujflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp. ,64 the 
Court held that International and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Mi-
das, were separate entities that could conspire in violation !Jf section 
1. The Court explained: "[S]ince respondents Midas and Interna-
tional availed themselves of the privilege of doing business through 
separate corporations, the fact of common ownership could not save 
them from any of the obligations that the law imposes on separate 
entities."65 This approach can bes(be described as forcing a business 
to accept certain.burdens if it desires to reap the benefits of sepa-
rately incorporating its divisions.66 Perma L!fe represents the high-
water mark in the development of the intraenterprise conspiracy 
doctrine: the Court completely disregarded the economic substance 
of the transaction and only considered its form.67 
In reaching this high water mark, the Perma L!fe Court did not 
cite or distinguish its decision in Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & 
Smith Citrus Products Co. 68 In Sunkist, the Court faced the question 
62. See, e.g., Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 579 F.2d 
20, 33-34 & n.49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978); H & B Equip. Co. v. International 
Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 243-45 (5th Cir. 1978). 
63. See, e.g., White v. Hearst Corp., 669 F.2d 14, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1982); Ogilvie v. Fotomat 
Corp., 641 F.2d 581, 587-90 (8th Cir. 1981); Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Su=a Corp., 610 F.2d 
614, 617-19 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 906 (1980); Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat 
Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 726-27 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980). There is argua-
bly a third view differing somewhat from an all-the-facts-and-circumstances approach that 
"limit[s] liability for intracorporate conspiracy to cases where two corporations have held 
themselves out as competitors." Handler & Smart, supra note 61, at 39. 
64. 392 U.S. 134 (1968). 
65. 392 U.S. at 141-42. 
66. This approach is advocated in a recent article by the attorneys who represented the Los 
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission in the Oakland Raiders case. See Blecher & Dan-
iels, Professional Sports And The "Single Entity" ./Jefense Under Section One Of The Sherman 
Act, 4 WHITTIER L. REV. 217, 225-26 (1982). 
67. The Supreme Court began formulating the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine in cases 
prior to Penna L!fe. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 597-98 
(1951); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951); United 
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1947). 
68. 370 U.S. 19 (1962). 
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of whether or not the three separate commonly-owned-and-con-
trolled entities that comprised the Sunk.ist organization could con-
spire among themselves in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
Sunk.ist, as an agricultural association, claimed exemption from the 
antitrust laws by virtue of the agricultural association exemption 
found in the Capper-Volstead Act69 and section 6 of the Clayton 
Act.70 The Court stated that these Acts permitted citrus growers to 
combine into one association, but was unable from the Acts to infer 
approval for combining into three commonly-owned-and-controlled 
associations.71 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that these associa-
tions were not independent entities for purposes of the Sherman 
Act,72 stating: 
Instead of a single cooperative, these growers through local associa-
tions first formed one area-wide organization (Sunkist) for marketing 
purposes. When it was decided to perform research and processing on 
a joint basis, separate organizations were formed . . . . At a later date 
one of these (Exchange Orange) was acquired by the Sunkist organiza-
tion and is presently held as a subsidiary. The other (Exchange 
Lemon) is still owned by the lemon-grower associations, all of whom 
are also member associations of Sunkist. With due respect to the con-
trary opinions of the Court of Appeals and District Court, we feel that 
the 12,000 growers here involved are in practical effect and in the con-
templation of the statutes one "organization" or "association" even 
though they have formally organized themselves into three separate 
legal entities. To hold otherwise would be to impose grave legal conse-
quences upon organizational distinctions that are of de minimis mean-
ing and effect to these growers who have banded together for 
processing and marketing purposes within the purview of the Clayton 
and Capper-Volstead Acts. There is no indication that the use of sepa-
rate corporations had economic significance in itself or that outsiders 
considered and dealt with the three entities as independent organiza-
tions. That the packing is done by local associations, the advertising, 
sales, and traffic by division of the area association, and the processing 
by separate organizations does not in our opinion preclude these grow-
ers from being considered one organization or association .... 73 
Although some courts have limited the Sunkist rationale to cases in-
volving agricultural associations covered by the Clayton and Cap-
per-Volstead Acts,74 others have extended Sunkist to Sherman Act 
69. 7 u.s.c. § 291 (1982). 
70. 15 u.s.c. § 17 (1982). 
71. 370 U.S. at 28-29. 
72. 370 U.S. at 27. 
73. 370 U.S. at 29. 
74. See, e.g., Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 579 
F.2d 20, 34 n.49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978). 
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cases not involving any statutory exemption.75 
This latter application is the sounder one. Because the Court in 
Sunkist refused to inf er from the Clayton and Capper-Volstead Acts 
approval for combining into three commonly-owned-and-controlled 
entities,76 the Court did not base its single-entity finding upon any 
policy applicable only to agricultural organizations. Thus, if de 
minimis organizational distinctions do not preclude commonly 
owned and controlled agricultural organizations from being deemed 
a single entity, neither should they preclude commonly owned and 
controlled non-agricultural organizations from being deemed a single 
entity. To hold otherwise gives rise to an antitrust policy divorced 
from market considerations and economic reality, a policy that the 
Court itself condemned in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania 
Inc.11 
Indeed, strict application of the intraenterprise conspiracy doc-
trine as in Perma Ltfe has been condemned in an Article and two 
student Notes that present the history of the doctrine in greater detail 
than this Article.78 One of the Notes clearly demonstrates that in 
each case where the Supreme Court applied the intraenterprise con-
spiracy doctrine, section 1 violations could have been found under 
existing case law without resort to that doctrine.79 Thus, not only is 
the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine ill-advised from the stand-
point of consumer wealth maximization, but it has been unnecessary 
to the results reached in those cases where the Court purported to 
apply it.80 In light of these considerations, use of an all-the-facts-
and-circumstances approach, which takes into account economic cri-
teria, 81 is the better way to determine whether the requisite plurality 
of actors exists for section 1 liability. 82 
15. See, e.g., William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 
1014, 1054-55 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 58 (1982); Giant Paper and Film Corp. v. 
Albermarle Paper Co., 430 F. Supp. 981, 985-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Sulmeyer v. Seven-Up Co., 
411 F. Supp. 635, 639-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
76. See note 71 supra and accompanying text. 
77. 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21, 54-57 (1977); see notes 44 & 51 supra and accompanying text. 
78. See, e.g., Handler & Smart, supra note 61, at 73-74; Note, "Conspiring Entities" Under 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 95 HARV. L. REV. 661 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Conspir-
ing Entities]; Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section 1 ef the Sherman Act: A Sug-
gested Standard. 75 MICH. L. REV. 717 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Intra-Enterprise 
Conspiracy]. 
79. Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy, supra note 78, at 718-27. 
80. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968); Timken 
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. 
Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 
(1947). 
8 I. See note 63 supra and accompanying text. 
82. Of the three pieces cited earlier, see note 78 supra, the Article and one of the Notes 
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In evaluating all the facts and circumstances to determine the 
number of entities that exist for antitrust purposes, courts have con-
sidered a number of factors. 83 The relevance of some of these factors 
submit that the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine should not apply where a parent corpora-
tion exercises substantial control over its subsidiary. Handler & Smart, supra note 61, at 73-74 
(no intraenterprise conspiracy can exist where parent can change corporate form of subsidi-
ary); Note.Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy,supra note 78, at 73S-38 (no intraenterprise conspiracy 
can exist where parent exercises day-to-day control over subsidiary). It is suggested that such 
an approach gives rise to greater predictability than does examining all the facts and circum-
stances. See Handler & Smart, supra note 61, at 74-7S. However, neither piece completely 
clarifies what elements of behavior are significant when the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine 
is applied only to commonly-owned brother-sister corporations. The uncertainty inherent in 
an all-the-facts-and-circumstances approach would also be alleviated by the approach sug-
gested by the third commentator, who contends that the only way to achieve predictability is to 
immuI1ize all agreements among related business entities from section 1 attack. See Note, 
Conspiring Entities,supra note 78. This approach, which seeks complete predictability, may at 
first appear contrary to the Supreme Court's recognition that predictability should not be 
achieved by rigid rules that are not based upon economic analysis. See notes 44 & SI supra 
and accompanying texL However, further analysis reveals much merit in this per se legal 
approach, which as yet has not been adopted by any court. The commentator who espouses 
this approach notes: 
Nor is a rule that separate incorporation suffices to make related corporations possible 
conspirators under section I consistent with the general goals of antitrust policy. A firm 
will select the organizational form that enables it to operate most efficiently, and there are 
legitimate business reasons for preferring the subsidiary form of organization. Potential 
section I liability, however, will artificially discourage operation through subsidiaries. Be-
cause the antitrust laws aim to promote economic efficiency and because no court has 
suggested that operation through subsidiaries itself threatens competition, it is inconsis-
tent with antitrust goals to make section 1 liability tum on the firm's choice of organiza-
tional form. 
Note, Conspiring Entities, supra note 78, at 667-68; see also Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy, 
supra note 78, at 728-29 (language supporting a similar point of view). This is but another way 
of saying that a business that operates via multiple legal entities should be treated no differ-
ently under section I than a business that is composed of multiple divisions that operate within 
one legal entity, because operation via multiple entities is not by itself output restrictive. How-
ever, because no court has accepted this per se legal approach and because the NFL structure 
does not fit squarely within a parent-subsidiary or brother-sister corporation framework, this 
Article will examine the NFL via an all-the-facts-and-circumstances approach. 
83. See, e.g.,Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1982), 
cert. granted in part, cert. denied in part, 103 S. Ct. 3109 (1983). In Independence Tube, the 
Seventh Circuit approved a jury charge that provided: 
So, in order to find that a combination or conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws existed 
between Copperweld and Regal, you must find that the two companies, in fact, operated 
as separate entities. In making this decision, you should consider the following matters: 
I. The history of the two companies, that is, whether they functioned as separate compa-
nies before they became affiliated; 
2. Whether the two companies are run by separate management staffs; 
3. Whether the two companies maintained separate corporate offices; 
4. Whether the parent corporation pays the salaries, expenses, or losses of the subsidiary; 
S. The degree to which the subsidiary sets its own policies regarding sales, engineering, 
production, purchasing, negotiation of labor agreements, and other aspects of his busi-
ness. In this connection you should consider both the day-to-day operating decisions and 
the major or executive policy decisions; 
6. Whether the subsidiary generates substantial business accounts independent of the 
parent, or whether the bulk of the sales of the subsidiary were made to other Copperweld 
corporations or subsidiaries; 
7. Whether the two companies maintained separate bank accounts, separate records, 
and separate facilities, including such things as pension plans; 
8. Whether both companies were separate participants in the alleged unlawful activity 
complained of by Independence; 
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might be open to question when viewed in the light of the proper 
goal of the antitrust laws: consumer wealth maximization. 84 How-
ever, one factor, not generally recognized by courts as controlling, 
should invariably lead to the conclusion that only one entity exists 
for antitrust purposes. That factor is the production of a product 
that each entity under consideration could not produce on its own. 
A court that purports to recognize the existence of such a product, 
however, implicitly recognizes that while a product of equal value 
might be produced by separate entities, the cost of production by 
separate entities would be prohibitively expensive.85 Thus, the joint 
action of what are apparently separate entities to produce the prod-
uct is an attempt to promote efficiencies rather than an attempt to 
restrict output. As a result, both the determination of whether one 
distinct product is being produced and the determination of whether 
a single entity exists for antitrust purposes are inextricably interwo-
ven with a determination of whether the challenged practice is un-
lawful because it is intended to restrict output or lawful because it is 
intended to promote efficiency. It must therefore be remembered 
that for purposes of this Article the term "all the facts and circum-
stances" and the term "new product" or "distinct product" are used 
as terms of art in an inquiry as to whether an activity is intended to 
promote efficiency or restrict output. 
In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 86 the 
Supreme Court had to decide, inter alia, whether the members of the 
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) 
were engaging in per se illegal price fixing. ASCAP was a clearing-
house for the licensing of copyrighted materials and the collection of 
royalties.87 By using ASCAP as a common sales agent, ASCAP's 
members offered a person who wished to use copyrighted works in 
the ASCAP repertory only the right to use the entire ASCAP reper-
9. Whether both companies have common officers or directors. The existence of some 
common officers or directors does not alone render the two companies incapable of 
conspiracy. 
You must consider all of the facts, and that includes the nine that I have given you here, 
and any other facts that you find that are relevant to a determination of whether or not 
Copperweld and Regal are separate and distinct companies capable of conspiring with 
each other. 
691 F.2d at 331-32 (appendix). 
84. For example, whether a parent and subsidiary have common officers and directors is 
irrelevant to an economic approach to intraenterprise conspiracy. See note 83 supra. 
85. A law firm is a single business producing legal services. Each of the lawyers in the firm 
could also produce legal services, but by joining together in a law firm they can produce more 
valuable legal services than they could alone in a manner that is not prohibitively expensive. 
86. 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
87. 441 U.S. at 5. 
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tory even if that prospective licensee desired to use only one or two 
works in the repertory. 88 Persons wishing to use copyrighted works 
but not ASCAP's services could search for and attempt to deal with 
each individual copyright owner.89 However, it generally proved 
much more convenient simply to deal with ASCAP.90 
The Court held that ASCAP's method of granting licenses was 
not a price-fixing scheme that was per se illegal under section 1, but 
instead should be examined under the Rule of Reason.91 In reaching 
its decision, the Court did not specifically hold that ASCAP was a 
single entity whose members, therefore, could not conspire in viola-
tion of section 1. Nonetheless, it did intimate that it held this belief 
when it stated: 
The blanket license is composed of the individual compositions plus 
the aggregating service. Here, the whole is truly greater than the sum 
of its parts; it is, to some extent, a different product. . . . Thus to the 
extent the blanket license is a different product, ASCAP is not really a 
joint sales agency offering the individual goods of many sellers, but is a 
separate seller offering its blanket license, of which the individual com-
positions are raw material. 
. . . ASCAP does set the price for its blanket license, but that li-
cense is quite different from anything any individual owner could 
issue.92 
88. See .441 U.S. at 5. 
89. 441 U.S. at 6, 23-24. 
90. See 441 U.S. at 22. 
91. See 441 U.S. at 8-10, 16-25. Section l's ban on restraints of trade is not effected di-
rectly, "but through two subsidiary rules, the [R]ule of [R]eason and the per se doctrine, which, 
taken together, tend to condemn arrangements which have the purpose or effect of significantly 
restraining competition and to validate those which do not." L. SULLIVAN, supra note 21, § 63, 
at 166 (1977). Stated differently, even efficiency-producing agreements restrain trade to some 
extent. Therefore, in enforcing the antitrust laws a distinction must be drawn between per se 
illegal agreements "in which the parties engage in no significant dealings other than the elimi-
nation of competition," R. BORK, supra note 28, at 27, and legitimate agreements whose 
subordinate and collateral restraints on trade are merely ancillary to the legitimate agreements. 
These latter agreements, when judged under Rule of Reason analysis, should be upheld. See 
R. BORK, supra note 28, at 26-28. Professor Sullivan describes the per se doctrine as a "special 
case of Rule of Reason analysis." L. SULLIVAN,supra note 21, § 72, at 196. "Where experience 
teaches that a particular practice is of a kind which blatantly restricts competition, we then 
know without further analysis how the balance will come out; we are spared the need for 
elaboration." Id. 
As noted earlier, Professor Sullivan does not adhere to the position that consumer wealth 
maximization should be the sole goal underlying antitrust policy. See note 59 supra. Thus, his 
use of the term "competition" does not necessarily comport with the way in which a consumer 
wealth maximization adherent would use it. However, Professor Sullivan's analysis of the 
distinction between the per se and Rule of Reason approaches does comport with that which a 
consumer wealth maximization adherent would make if the term "competition" were defined 
in a consumer wealth maximization manner, i.e., a goal that consists of the Pareto optimal 
state. See Part I, Sec. A supra. 
92. 441 U.S. at 21-23 (citations and footnotes omitted). Indeed, Justice Rehnquist, in not-
ing that the NFL produces a product different from that which each of its teams could produce 
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Most likely, the Court went no further than it did in its holding be-
cause ASCAP had never specifically raised the issue of whether or 
not it was a single entity whose members when acting in concert 
could not violate section 1. Moreover, ASCAP probably did not 
claim single-entity status because it believed that it could succeed 
with the argument that, inasmuch as prospective licensees could deal 
with copyright owners directly, price fixing, a per se violation, had 
not taken place. Since the district court had agreed with ASCAP on 
this issue93 and found no violation under a Rule of Reason ap-
proach,94 ASCAP probably made a tactical decision that its chances 
of winning were greater if it did not raise the single-entity issue as 
such.95 Still, the above-quoted language of the Court demonstrates 
its receptivity to the argument that if multiple entities act together to 
produce a product different from that which each entity could pro-
duce on its own, those m1:1ltiple entities should be deemed a single 
entity for antitrust purposes. 
Eight Justices joined in the 1979 Broadcast Music opinion.96 
Since it postdated the Sylvania decision, Broadcast Music can be re-
garded as part of the Supreme Court's progression toward adopting 
consumer wealth maximization as the sole policy governing antitrust 
decisions. As already noted, in moving toward adopting this con-
sumer welfare approach, the Court demonstrated a more sophisti-
cated understanding of economic principles than it had shown only a 
few years earlier in the 1972 Topco case.97 Consequently, it is un-
likely that the 1945 case of Associated Press v. United States,98 in 
which three Justices dissented,99 could now support the proposition 
independently, analogized the NFL to ASCAP and quoted some of the language quoted in the 
text with approval. NASL, 103 S. Ct. 499, 500-01 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
93. Columbia Broadcasting System v. American Society of Composers, 337 F. Supp. 394, 
398 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), 400 F. Supp. 737, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977), 
rev'd sub nom. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. I (1979). 
94. 400 F. Supp. at 780-83. 
95. While ASCAP did not claim single-entity status, in an amicus brief for Aaron Cop-
land, Judge (then-Professor) Bork, as Copland's _counsel, hinted at a single-entity approach in 
arguing that ASCAP was analogous to a law firm or sports league. Bork argued that if AS-
CAP's actions were found to be per se illegal, then no law firm or sports league could function 
legally. Amicus Brief for Aaron Copland at 8-14, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad-
casting System, 441 U.S. I (1979). Still, even this brief did not specifically claim that ASCAP 
was a single entity so that all of its internally determined practices should be immune from 
section I attack. 
96. See 441 U.S. at 3. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion. 441 U.S. at 25-38 (Ste-
vens, J ., dissenting). 
97. See notes 48-49 supra and accompanying text. 
98. 326 U.S. I (1945). 
99. 326 U.S. at 29-49, (Roberts, J., dissenting, joined by Stone, C.J.); 326 U.S. at 49-60 
(Murphy, J., dissenting). 
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that a business composed of multiple entities cannot claim single-
entity status when it produces a product that its component entities 
are incapable of producing alone. 
Associated Press (AP) was a cooperative of over 1,200 newspa-
pers100 that, according to Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion, 
was organized "for the gathering, editing, and distributing of news 
which [its] member papers cannot collect single-handed, and which 
requires their pooled resources."101 The Court found that even 
though AP did not have monopoly power, AP had violated sections 
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by, inter alia, prohibiting AP members 
from selling news to non-members and allowing AP members to 
veto membership applications of competing newspapers. 102 AP could 
have argued that as a producer of a product that its members could 
not produce alone, it was a single entity for section 1 purposes. 
However, the single-entity issue was not specifically raised inAssoci-
ated Press, just as it was not specifically raised in Broadcast Music. 
As a result, the Court in Associated Press was not squarely faced 
with the issue of whether AP should have been deemed a single en-
tity. However, Justice Roberts' dissent appeared to recognize AP as 
a single entity in noting that AP was merely a producer that decided 
to keep its product for itself. 103 Justice Murphy, in his compelling 
dissent, described the problem in a manner that was a harbinger of 
the Court's consumer welfare approach in Broadcast Music: 
As I view the situation, the members of the Associated Press were 
entirely within their legal rights in forming a cooperative organization 
with facilities for the collection and exchange of news and in limiting 
the membership therein. Members of an incorporated society, as a 
general rule, may extend the privilege of membership or withhold it on 
such terms as they see fit. And if exclusive access to these facilities and 
reports gave the members of the Associated Press a competitive advan-
tage over business rivals who were not members, that alone would not 
make the advantage unlawful. In restricting the admission of business 
rivals they were merely trying to preserve for themselves an advantage 
that had accrued to them from the exercise of business sagacity and 
foresight. Such an advantage, as I see it, is not a violation of the Sher-
man Act. Nor does this advantage require the Associated Press to 
share its products with competitors. Such a doctrine would discourage 
competitive enterprise and would carry the anti-trust laws to absurd 
lengths. In the words of the court below, "a combination may be 
100. 326 U.S. at 3. 
101. 326 U.S. at 26 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
102. 326 U.S. at 8-13. 
103. 326 U.S. at 30-33 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
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within its rights, although it operates to the prejudice of outsiders 
whom it excludes." 
Thus for the first time the Court today uses the Sherman Act to 
outlaw a reasonable competitive advantage gained without the benefit 
of any of the evils that Congress had in mind when it enacted this 
statute. On the main issue before us, the record shows a complete ab-
sence of any monopoly, domination, price fixing, coercion or other 
predatory practices by which competition is eliminated to the injury of 
the public interest. 104 
Although the Court in Broadcast Music did not discuss or distin-
guish Associated Press, its approach to a similar problem greatly 
reduces the Associated Press opinion's precedential value on the sin-
gle-entity issue. 
If antitrust decisions are to be based upon economic reality, 
courts should look to all the facts and circumstances when deciding 
if the requisite plurality of actors is present for section 1 purposes. 
In particular, the production of a product that could only be created 
through the joint efforts of the separate entities should weigh heavily 
in favor of a finding that the requisite plurality of actors is absent. 
The next part of this Article, by analogizing the NFL to a law firm 
partnership, will demonstrate that the NFL is producing something 
that each of its members could not produce alone or in a di.ff erent 
league: an entertainment product for sale to the public and the tele-
vision networks. 
III. THE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL 
LEAGUE AND A LAW FIRM PARTNERSHIP 
When a court applies the all-the-facts-and-circumstances test, it 
must examine the operation of an enterprise from an economically 
realistic viewpoint. In doing this, a court should not examine each 
aspect of the enterprise in a vacuum. Rather, it must examine each 
aspect in light of the overall goals of the enterprise. If an aspect 
under scrutiny could be intended to aid the entity in achieving its 
goals more efficiently, the court should discount the fact that the par-
ticular aspect, if examined in the abstract, might imply the existence 
of multiple economic entities. 
In Smith v. Pro Football, Inc. , 105 the District of Columbia Circuit 
Court of Appeals correctly noted that the goal of the NFL is to pro-
duce entertainment that will both attract fans at the gate and lure in 
lucrative television· contracts.106 The NASL and Oakland Raiders 
104. 326 U.S. at 50 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
105. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
106. 593 F.2d at 1178-79. 
24 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 82:1 
courts, in examining various aspects of the NFL's operations, did not 
consider how those operational aspects might aid the NFL in reach-
ing its goal efficiently. Rather, the courts examined those aspects 
without reference to the NFL's business aims and thus concluded 
that they indicated the existence of separate economic entities. This 
part will first explore the unique business nature of the NFL. Then 
it will demonstrate that those aspects of the NFL's operations that 
the NASL and Oakland Raiders courts found indicative of multiple 
entities actually aid the NFL in promoting the efficient production of 
an attractive entertainment product, or are analogous to methods 
that a law firm partnership could properly use to provide legal serv-
ices more efficiently, or both. 
Although the teams of the NFL compete against each other on 
the field, they must not compete against each other economically, or 
all will be harmed. This was recognized by one district court as long 
ago as 1953 in United States v. NFL. 107 The United States v. NFL 
court acknowledged that the NFL needs certain rules, such as 
player-mobility restraints, to attempt to equalize the playing ability 
of the various teams. This conclusion was derived from the recogni-
tion that relative equality of playing ability is needed to sustain fan 
interest, which is necessary for the economic survival of the 
League. 108 The court noted that if the teams competed against each 
other economically, weaker teams either would be driven out of 
business or would no longer be competitive on the field. 109 If this 
were to happen, the victory for the stronger teams would be Pyrrhic. 
With only weak competition, fans would lose interest, and conse-
quently even the stronger teams would fail financially. 110 Indeed, 
one of the major causes of the failure of the All-America Confer-
ence, a league that competed with the NFL in the 1940's, was the 
near-total domination of the Conference by the Cleveland Browns. 
Once it became obvious that the Browns were the dominant team, 
average per game attendance at Browns' games over a four-year 
span dropped from between 60,000 to 70,000 spectators to 20,000 
spectators.111 Furthermore, the court noted that the domination of 
baseball's American League by the New York Yankees weakened 
major league baseball as a product. 112 
107. 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953). 
108. 116 F. Supp. at 324. 
109. 116 F. Supp. at 323-24. 
110. 116 F. Supp. at 323-26. 
Ill. Note, The NFL's Final Victory Over Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc.: Single Entity-In• 
terleague Economic Analysis, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 541, 556 n.87 (1978). 
112. 116 F. Supp. at 324 n.6. 
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This evidence of the need for economic cooperation among NFL 
teams, however, did not lead the United States v. NFL court to the 
conclusion that the NFL was a single entity. The single-entity issue 
was never raised, and the decision in Associated Press v. United 
States, 113 which was only eight years old at the time, apparently in-
fluenced the court in its assumption that the requisite plurality of 
actors was present.114 The need for cooperation among the various 
teams did, however, convince the court that the Rule of Reason ap-
proach should be used in analyzing the challenged practices. The 
court then upheld a provision of the NFL by-laws that prohibited 
the telecasting of outside games into the home territory of a third 
team on a day that the third team was playing at home (for example, 
the telecasting of a Chicago-New York game into the Pittsburgh area 
on a day that the Pittsburgh Steelers were playing at home). The 
court believed that this prohibition was a reasonable means of assist-
ing weak home teams in bolstering their home attendance, thereby 
strengthening the League as a whole. 115 In determining whether all 
of the challenged practices were reasonable, the court primarily ex-
amined the potential effect of the practices on attendance at football 
games. 116 Under this analysis, other broadcasting and telecasting re-
strictions were struck down because they were not reasonably neces-
sary to bolster attendance at games. 117 
Since the decision in United States v. NFL, other courts have rec-
ognized that the teams of the NFL are not typical economic competi-
tors. This r~cognition has led to various consequences in the courts. 
It has precluded application of the per se rule to find certain player 
restraints to be an illegal group boycott. 118 The unique business na-
ture of the NFL also led to the following statement by the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in striking down a version of the Rozelle 
Rule under the Rule of Reason: "[T]he NFL assumes some of the 
characteristics of a joint venture .... " 119 Furtherm,ore, in invali-
dating the NFL player draft under the Rule of Reason, the District 
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Smith v. Pro Foot-
113. 326 U.S. 1 (1945). See notes 98-104 supra and accompanying text. 
114. See 116 F. Supp. at 321 (citingAssociated Press for the proposition that the NFL by-
laws constitute a "contract" within the meaning of Sherman Act§ 1). 
115. 116 F. Supp. at 324-25. 
116. 116 F. Supp. at 325. 
117. 116 F. Supp. at 326-27. 
118. Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73, 80-82 (N.D. Cal. 1974), qffd. on other grounds, 586 
F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979). 
119. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977) 
(emphasis in original). 
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ball, Inc. :120 
[T]he NFL clubs which have 'combined' to implement the draft are not 
competitors in any economic sense. The clubs operate basically as a 
joint venture in producing an entertainment product-football games 
and telecasts. No NFL club can produce this product without agree-
ments and joint action with every other team. 121 
In none of the foregoing player-restraint cases, however, did the 
court fail to find the requisite plurality of actors. 122 The Smith 
120. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
121. 593 F.2d at 1178-79 (emphasis in original). 
122. Prior to Smith, two cases found sports leagues other than the NFL to be single entities 
when the Sherman Act§ 1 issues raised did not involve player restraints. In Levin v. National 
Basketball Association, 385 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), the court upheld, in the face of a 
section 1 challenge, the right of National Basketball Association owners to veto the sale of the 
Boston Celtics to Mes,srs. Levin and Lipton. The Levin court found the team owners "to be 
partners in the operation of a sports league for ... profit." 385 F. Supp. at 152. Since there 
was no anticompetitive purpose in rejecting Levin and Lipton's franchise application, the court 
held that the team owners, as partners, were free to reject the application to join the partner-
ship. 385 F. Supp. at 152. The Levin court believed that cases holding that player restraints 
violated section 1 could be reconciled as striking down provisions that limited competition in 
the players' market. 385 F. Supp. at 152 n.6. 
In San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 
1974), the court held that a refusal by the member teams of the National Hockey League 
(NHL) to permit the San Francisco/Oakland franchise to move to Vancouver did not violate 
section 1. Noting that "there must be at least two independent business entities accused of 
combining or conspiring to restrain trade" for a section I violation to exist, 379 F. Supp. at 
969, the Seals court found that the NHL's teams constituted a single business entity that pro-
duced a product in competition with other sports leagues. 379 F. Supp. at 369. Unlike the 
Levin court, the Seals court did not offer any dicta about the player-restraint cases. 
Nonetheless, prior to Smith, at least one court expressed doubt about whether or not 
player-restraint provisions could violate section I. In Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. 
Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972), the court held that the 
NHL's reserve and other player-restraint systems violated section 2 of the Sherman Act be-
cause they were operated with the purpose and effect of precluding a competing league from 
obtaining high-quality hockey players. 351 F. Supp. at 504-13. The court, however, expressed 
doubt about whether the NHL's player-restraint system violated section 1. In noting its 
doubts, the court observed that the NHL had an interest in maintaining a competitive balance 
among its teams, and that player restraints might aid in preserving that balance. 351 F. Supp. 
at 503-04. 
After the Smith case, the district court inNASL, 505 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), revd., 
670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 499 (1982), held that while the member teams 
of the NFL can violate section 1 by agreements that affect areas in which they compete with 
one another, a cross-ownership ban does not violate section 1 because it does not affect compe-
tition between the member teams but rather aids the NFL as a whole in competing with other 
sports leagues for fan dollars. 505 F. Supp. at 677. Consequently, the NFL was deemed a 
single entity by the district court for purposes of the cross-ownership ban issue. 505 F. Supp. 
at 677. The failure to recognize that the member teams of the NFL should be deemed a single 
entity whenever any of their internal agreements are challenged under section I has led to 
inconsistent treatment of the NFL in section 1 cases. The Second Circuit, unfortunately, elimi• 
nated this inconsistency by compounding the error and finding a section I combination in the 
NASL case when clearly there was not one. See NASL, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 103 S. Ct. 499 (1982). As noted earlier, the purpose of this article is to present an 
approach under which the NFL can consistently be found to be a single entity for section I 
purposes. See notes 7-24 supra and accompanying text. 
Finally, in Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 550 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Pa. 1982), the court cited 
Levin v. National Basketball Association, 385 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), with approval in 
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court's statement is inconsistent with its conclusion that section 1 was 
violated, and the subsequently erroneous analysis by the Smith court 
that led to this conclusion will be discussed in the next part of this 
article.123 Before further examining the section 1 analysis used by 
the Smith court, however, it is necessary to examine the structural 
and operational aspects of the NFL that led the Smith court to con-
clude that the NFL is like a joint venture, and the structural and 
operational aspects of the NFL that led the NASL and Oakland 
Raiders courts to conclude that the NFL is composed of multiple 
economic entities. An examination of these aspects in the light of the 
overall goals of the NFL should demonstrate that these aspects are 
intended to aid the NFL in reaching its business goals more effi-
ciently or are analogous to ways in which law firms could legiti-
mately operate, or both. As a result, the inescapable conclusion 
should be that the NFL is a single entity under the all-the-facts-and-
circumstances test. 
In finding the NFL teams "operating basically as a joint venture 
in producing an entertainment product-football games and tele-
casts," 124 the Smith court noted: "[T]he League not only determines 
franchise locations, playing schedules, and broadcast terms, but also 
ensures that the clubs receive equal shares of telecast and ticket reve-
nues."125 Apparently, it was the sharing of revenues that greatly in-
fluenced the Smith court in finding an economic joint venture. Yet 
the fact that it is revenues, rather than overall profits and losses, that 
are shared appears to have troubled the Oakland Raiders court with 
upholding a decision by the NFL not to expand and grant an expansion franchise to the plain-
tiffs. 550 F. Supp. at 567-68. In Mid-South Grizzlies, however, the court did not specifically 
find the NFL to be a single entity. Rather, the court used the NFL's need for joint activity as 
justificiation for a Rule of Reason approach to the alleged group boycott. 550 F. Supp. at 565-
69. The court then held that the decision not to grant an expansion franchise to the plaintiffs 
was grounded on valid business reasons. The court noted that the NFL was, at the time of 
plaintiffs request for NFL membership, still trying to absorb two other new teams, and any 
expansion then would have hurt the operation of the League. 550 F. Supp. at 568-69. Addi-
tionally, the court noted that if the NFL were ordered to grant franchises to all acceptable 
applicants, the result would be anticompetitive in that no rival league might develop. 550 F. 
Supp. at 568. Indeed, the court noted that one of the plaintiffs had become a team owner in the 
NFL's new rival, the United States Football League. 550 F. Supp. at 570. 
While Mid-South Grizzlies did not specifically hold that the NFL is a single entity, that 
implication was strongly present. The court upheld the challenged practice by in effect deter-
mining that it was intended to promote efficiencies and that to strike down the practice might 
restrict output by inhibiting the growth of new football leagu~s. 550 F. Supp. at 568. Mid-
South Grizzlies, while not perfectly reasoned on the single-entity issue, demonstrates the most 
sophisticated approach taken to date. 
123. See Part IV, Sec. A infra: • 
124. 593 F.2d at 1179. 
125. 593 F.2d at 1179. 
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respect to the single-entity issue. 126 
The degree of revenue sharing is quite substantial. The NFL di-
vides its television receipts equally among all its teams. Pre-season 
gate receipts are shared equally between the competing teams in 
each game, and regular season gate receipts are split 60 percent for 
the home team and 40 percent for the visiting team. The only reve-
nues not shared are concession receipts, parking receipts, certain lo-
cal television and radio receipts, 127 and certain additional revenues 
that the Super Bowl teams receive. 128 As a result of revenue sharing 
and the large impact on revenues caused by national television re-
ceipts, the NFL teams in effect pool 90 to 95 percent of all their 
revenues. 129 
How determinative, therefore, should be the fact that after 90 to 
95 percent of the revenues are shared, some teams may fare better 
financially than others as a result of being more successful in earning 
unshared revenues? Not very! A law firm may allocate a base dol-
lar amount to each partner as a draw throughout the year and fur-
ther compensate each partner in differing amounts at the end of each 
year. The total compensation might depend upon various factors, 
such as the success of each partner's legal efforts and the number and 
quality of clients generated by each partner. Alternatively, a law 
firm may allocate base revenues to each department to cover over-
head, salaries, and partners' draws. The firm could further compen-
sate each department at the end of each year so that the total 
compensation depends upon the success of legal efforts, fees gener-
ated, and new clients obtained. Within a law firm, therefore, a cer-
tain degree of competition exists among the partners and among the 
departments. This results in differing :financial rewards for different 
Rartners and departments. This competition, however, is healthy, 
since rewarding those who are most successful in their legal endeav-
ors or who generate more business induces each partner and depart-
ment to act in a manner that strengthens the law firm as a whole. 
Similarly, in the NFL, the pooled revenues can be analogized to 
126. Oakland Raiders, 519 F. Supp. 581, 582 (C.D. Cal. 1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-
5572 (9th Cir. June 14, 1982). 
127. NASL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1251-52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 499 (1982). 
128. NFL Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions Of Law at 11, NASL, 
505 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), revd, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 499 
(1982) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review); see also Axthelm, McAlevey, Fineman, 
Ma, Contreras, & McCormick, They're Playing for Keeps, Newsweek, Sept. 20, 1982, at 70 
("The teams share 97 percent of their revenues and the stadiums are almost always full."), 
129. NFL Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 11, NASL, 
505 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), revd, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 499 
(1982) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
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the base partner's draws or the revenues allocated to each depart-
ment for overhead, salaries, and partners' draws. The unshared rev-
enues are like the incentives given to law firm partners or 
departments to operate in a manner that will benefit the firm as a 
whole. For example, giving each home team 60 percent of its gate 
receipts induces the team to attempt to sell out the stadium. But a 
sold-out stadium does much more than benefit the home team. It 
benefits the entire League because it enables the NFL to demand 
greater sums from the television networks for the sale of television 
rights, which is the NFL's prime source of revenue. The right of 
each home team to retain parking and concession fees is simply an 
additional incentive to fill the stadium so that the product is more 
marketable to the television networks. The television networks, in 
deciding how much to pay to broadcast NFL football games, must 
compare the popularity of NFL football with the popularity of all 
other forms of entertainment that they could broadcast. A filled sta-
dium thus makes local broadcast rights more valuable, so the right to 
retain fees from them is also an appropriate reward to each team. 
Each of the foregoing opportunities for teams to earn additional 
monies on their own is evidence not of competing business entities, 
but rather of incentives to each of the business partners to make the 
NFL as a whole as successful and marketable a business as possible. 
The right of the Super Bowl teams to retain certain additional 
revenues can similarly be viewed as benefitting the entire NFL. For 
the NFL to be marketable to television networks, the teams must not 
only be evenly matched, but also must demonstrate a very high cali-
ber of play. By additionally rewarding Super Bowl teams, the NFL 
encourages each team to provide the highest caliber of play possible. 
Viewed in this light, it is difficult to distinguish the financial reward 
system of the NFL from that of a major law firm. 
The Oakland Raiders court, however, noted that the NFL ap-
pears to consist of 28 separate businesses because some teams are 
corporations, some are partnerships, and none are commonly 
owned. 130 Yet this may also be considered analogous to a law firm. 
A cursory review of the Martindale-Hubbell Law .Directory 131 will 
show many law firms in which some or all of the partners are sepa-
rately incorporated. 132 Additionally, no two partners in a law firm 
130. Oakland Raiders, 519 F. Supp. 581, 582 (C.D. Cal. 1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-
5572 (9th Cir. June 14, 1982). 
131. See, e.g., 5 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 1370B (11th ed. 1983) (law firm 
of Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay). 
132. It should be noted that I.R.C. § 269A (1982), which was added to the Internal Reve-
nue Code by section 250(a) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. 
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usually have a common "owner." Therefore, the mere fact that each 
team is separately organized as a business entity should not lead to 
the conclusion that the NFL consists of multiple economic entities 
for section 1 purposes. 
Similarly, the simple fact that some teams may operate at a loss 
for one or more years while other teams operate at a profit should 
not prevent the NFL from being analogous to a partnership. Under 
the Internal Revenue Code, a partnership agreement can allow part-
ners to share profits and losses unequally so long as the agreement 
has a "substantial economic effect."133 It can even permit some part-
ners to receive profits while others receive losses. 134 A partnership 
agreement has a "substantial economic effect" if the profit and loss 
allocation affects the dollar amount of the partners' shares indepen-
dently of tax consequences. 135 Whether or not there is a valid busi-
ness purpose for the allocation apart from a desire to save taxes 
should be relevant to whether or not the allocation affects the 
amount of the partners' shares independently of tax consequences. 136 
The NFL allows teams to receive differing rates of return, which can 
result in some operating at a profit while others operate at a loss. 
However, this induces each team to operate efficiently and profita-
bly, so as to benefit the League as a whole by enabling the NFL, as a 
single entity, to concentrate its efforts on providing as marketable a 
product as possible. 
Furthermore, if single-entity status were determined by whether 
or not all the component entities were simultaneously operating at 
either a profit or loss, the determination would in effect be based on 
thePerma Ltfe Mt!lflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp. 137 approach 
that elevates form over_substance. 138 Quite often one wholly-owned-
and-controlled subsidiary operates at a loss while a sister corpora-
tion and the parent of both of them operate at a profit. However, to 
let this fact alone give rise to finding a multiplicity of actors would 
require ignoring economic reality, especially if one subsidiary, by 
No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982), eliminates many of the advantages that flow from such a law 
firm structure. As a result, this type of law firm structure may become less prevalent. How-
ever, the existence ofl.R.C. § 269A (1982), and the practical effect it may have on the future 
structure oflaw firms, do not negate the fact that a law firm can be composed of partners who 
are separate!y incorporated .. 
133. I.R.C. § 704 (a)-(b) (1982): 
134. See Treas. Reg.§ 1.704-l(b)(2) (1956) (example 3). 
135. Treas. Reg.§ 1.704-l(b)(2) (1956). 
136. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-l(b), T.D. 6771, 1964-2 C.B. 177, 178.' 
137. 392 U.S. 134 (1968). 
138. See.notes 64-67 supra and accompanying text. 
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operating at a loss, could affect the operations of the profitable sister 
and parent and thus the operations of the units as a whole. 
If one or more NFL teams failed financially, the NFL as a whole 
would be damaged because the surviving teams would be left with 
fewer teams to play, and fan interest in the geographic areas where 
teams had failed could deteriorate. Deterioration of fan interest 
could in tum lead to a deterioration in the marketability of the NFL 
for network television, thus lowering the revenues of all teams. To 
prevent teams from failing financially, the NFL has assumed respon-
sibility for the satisfaction of certain debts of some of its member 
teams. 139 Funds to satisfy these debts must, of course, come from the 
financially stronger teams. 140 To imply, therefore, as did the NASL 
court, 141 that the NFL is not a single entity because one team may 
operate at a profit while another operates at a loss ignores the fact 
that a partnership can allocate profits and losses among the partners 
in any manner so long as the allocation is motivated by something 
other than tax avoidance. Furthermore, such an implication ignores 
the economic reality that the ultimate financial success of each team 
is intertwined with the financial success of every other team and af-
fects the operation of the League as a whole. Thus, the conclusion 
that the NFL consists of multiple entities due to its profit and loss 
allocations is economically unrealistic. 
The Oakland Raiders court also contended that the NFL is un-
like a partnership because the teams do not exchange books and 
139. NFL's Briefln Support Of Single Entity Theory at 28, Oakland Raiders, 519 F. Supp. 
581 (C.D. Cal. 1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-5572 (9th Cir. June 14, 1982) (copy on file with 
the Michigan Law Review). 
140. The NFL operates in much the same manner as other sports leagues. Teams in other 
leagues sometimes assist one league member financially in order to aid the league as a whole. 
These activities in other leagues are helpful in determining the types of actions that NFL teams 
could take to aid a member team. 
When the World Hockey Association was being formed, the Winnipeg team drafted Bobby 
Hull, but to sign him, Winnipeg had to offer him a million-dollar bonus. Winnipeg apparently 
was unable to afford such a large bonus. However, because Bobby Hull's presence in the 
WHA would benefit the league as a whole, each WHA team contributed a pro rata share of 
Mr. Hull's bonus. See Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, 
Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462,492 (E.D. Pa. 1972). No evidence of similar action by the NFL could 
be found. However, if a new football league decided to raid one financially weak NFL team 
for its stars, nothing would preclude the other NFL teams from similarly aiding that team. 
The Bobby Hull situation is, however, similar to another means by which the NFL teams 
do cooperate as partners. Whenever an expansion franchise is granted, the new team can select 
players from the rosters of existing teams. In other words, existing teams provide player per-
sonnel to staff new teams. See, e.g., Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 550 F. Supp. 558, 561 n.5 
(E.D. Pa. 1982). This practice is analogous to the manner in which a law firm could staff a 
new department or a new branch office. 
141. NASL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1252 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 499 (1982). 
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records. 142 However, since 90 to 95 percent of the revenues are 
pooled, and game attendance figures, and ticket, concession and 
parking prices are published, each team has a general knowledge of 
the revenue earned by every other team. Further, to determine 
whether responsibility for the debts of a weak team should be as-
sumed, certain financial information must be made available to the 
other teams. Thus, when the League as a whole must act to protect 
its overall financial interests, the separate teams cannot as a practical 
matter act as separate fiefdoms and keep all their internal financial 
information to themselves. 
Another point raised by the Oakland Raiders court to demon-
strate that the NFL consists of multiple entities was the fact that each 
team hires its own personnel. 143 However, law firms could permit the 
partners in one department to decide which applicants to hire, espe-
cially if the person hired was to work exclusively in that department. 
A law firm could even permit the partners in one department to off er 
a prospective associate a higher salary than that offered to associates 
in other departments. Each department could be allocated a base 
amount to cover overhead, associate salaries, and base partner 
draws. By offering an associate more than he would ordinarily be 
paid, a department's partners would be gambling that the higher-
paid associate would be more productive and profitable than a 
lower-paid associate. For the gamble to be profitable, the higher-
paid associate would have to be so productive that the partners 
would not have to reduce their total draws to pay him. Greater pro-
ductivity by the associate could even result in larger bonus payments 
for the partners of that department. Such a system could encourage 
interdepartmental competition that could strengthen the entire law 
firm. If the practice were successful for one department, all depart-
ments could increase the amount offered to attract top-quality asso-
ciates, thereby strengthening the firm as a whole. Therefore, 
separate hiring by each NFL team is closely analogous to what could 
be done by a law firm and is consistent with a finding of single-entity 
status.144 
Furthermore, it can be argued that each NFL team does not have 
complete independence in hiring its own personnel. Not only is each 
142. Oakland Raiders, 519 F. Supp. 581, 582 (C.D. Cal. 1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-
5572 (9th Cir. June 14, 1982). 
143. 519 F. Supp. at 582. 
144. A system that allowed each department to set its pay scale for associates might be 
inadvisable for numerous reasons, not the least of which is that associates could be demoral-
ized if they were in departments that paid less initially than other departments. What is im-
portant for the discussion here, however, is that a law firm could adopt this system. 
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team limited in its ability to hire any unsigned player that it 
desires, 145 but also each contract between a team and a player must 
be executed on a standard form contract adopted by the NFL.146 
Any amendment of the form contract by a team must first be ap-
proved by the Commissioner.147 Additionally, the Commissioner 
may invalidate any player contract if the contract violates the NFL 
Constitution and By-Laws or if the team or player has acted in a 
manner detrimental to professional football. 148 In fact, it was Com-
missioner Rozelle's insistence that Joe Kapp execute the standard 
player contract that precipitated Kapp's suit challenging various 
player-restraint practices.149 A law firm that permits each depart-
ment to do its own hiring must first have made a firm-wide decision 
to delegate hiring to each of the departments. The NFL, however, 
has not even gone that far. Its delegation to each of the teams to do 
its own player hiring is always subject to final approval by the NFL 
Commissioner.150 
Thus, in the final analysis, the unitary nature of the NFL's prod-
uct should weigh heavily in favor of finding single-entity status. The 
NFL attempts to make NFL football as popular as possible so that it 
can compete effectively against other forms of entertainment for net-
work television revenues. 151 The internal restraints and agreements 
made by the League are designed to promote efficiencies in attaining 
this end. They are only ancillary to the main purpose of producing a 
more marketable product. Viewed in this manner, these restraints 
should not be subject to successful challenge under the Sherman 
Act.1s2 
In the Oakland Raiders case, however, the court did not perceive 
NFL football as a unitary product. It noted that the Raiders them-
selves had previously belonged to a rival league and did not see why 
145. For a description of the operation of the player restraint rules, see note 16 supra. 
146. NFL CONST. AND BY-LAWS art. XV,§ 15.l (1976). 
147. NFL CONST. AND BY-LAWS art. XV,§ 15.l (1976). 
148. NFL CONST. AND BY-LAWS art. XV, § 15.4 (1976). 
149. Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73, 77-78 (N.D. Cal. 1974), ajfd on other grounds, 586 
F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 907 (1979). 
150. Presumably, the delegation of authority to a department in a law firm would be sub-
ject to similar restraints. If a department hired in a manner that displeased the firm as a whole, 
the entire partnership would most likely revoke the hiring authority that had previously been 
delegated. 
151. The need to make football popular explains why the NFL does not attempt to formal-
ize its single-entity status by incorporating. "[T]he appearance of total separation and inde-
pendence between teams is clearly a vital element in the sale of NFL football to consumers. 
The integrity of the games depends on the separation of the teams, and that aura of legitimacy 
is an essential component of fan interest." Blecher & Daniels, supra note 66, at 225. 
152. See note 91 supra. 
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they could not secede from the NFL to join a new league that would 
compete against the NFL.153 However, by joining a new league, the 
Raiders would be attempting to market a new product: football pro-
duced by that new league. Unless that product appeared to be com-
petitive in the overall entertainment field, it might not be purchased 
by network or cable television and would quite likely suffer financial 
collapse. Indeed, the failure of the World Football League to com-
pete successfully with the NFL was caused in great measure by its 
inability to sell its product to the major television networks. 154 This 
belies the contention of the Oakland Raiders court that the NFL's 
product does not have a unitary quality. 155 
A sports league, therefore, must structure itself so that it can best 
compete for the network or cable television dollar. The NFL is a 
single entity that has no monopoly power when competing against 
other forms of entertainment. 156 Consequently, it should be left to 
153. Oakland Raiders, 519 F. Supp. 581, 584 (C.D. Cal. 1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-
5572 (9th Cir. June 14, 1982). 
154. See, e.g., Johnson, The .Day the Money Ran Out, Sports Illustrated, Dec. I, 1975, at 84; 
Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1975, at 23, col. 2; Gamett,As WFL Struggles, Players Count House and 
Sign Autographs, Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 1975, at 1, col. 4. Eddie Einhorn, who held the World 
Football League's television franchise in 1974, which he refused to renew in 1975, said: 
In the final analysis, the World Football League had mediocrity written all over it ••.. I 
think the lack of a national television package definitely hurt their credibility, too. If a 
league's not good enough to have a national TV game of the week, a guy doesn't want to 
go. It's bush and he's not going to pay money to see it. 
Johnson, The .Day the Money Ran Out, Sports Illustrated, Dec. 1, 1975, at 88. 
155. 519 F.Supp. at 584 n.5. Indeed, the ability of the Raiders to leave the NFL to join a 
new league is indistinguishable from the ability of a law partner to switch law firms. But 
unlike a law partner, the Raiders could not depart from the "firm" to set up a solo practice. A 
football team is in this sense even less an independent business entity than a partner, whose 
agreements with his co-partners would not be considered § 1 violations. 
156. This article argues that because the NFL should be considered a single entity, it can-
not be held liable under Sherman Act § 1, which requires a plurality of actors. See notes 3 & 
21 supra. However, it might still be held liable under Sherman Act § 2 for the offense of 
monopolization if it possesses substantial market power and engages in some prohibited con-
duct. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 272-75 (2d Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). 
Market power is generally measured indirectly through defining relevant product and geo-
graphic markets, and then measuring a particular enterprises's share of the market as defined. 
The higher the market share, the more likely the enterprise possesses monopoly power. 
The complexities of the process of market definition are too involved for discussion here. 
Suffice it to say that this article posits that the relevant product market for NFL football is the 
"entertainment" market, rather than narrower markets such as "sports," "football," "profes-
sional football," or "major league professional football." Should the quality of the NFL's 
product deteriorate to any perceptible degree or should the cost of "using" its product rise, 
some fans undoubtedly would tum to another form of entertainment, whether that be college 
football, professional basketball, John Wayne westerns, classical music, or something else. Be-
cause of the broad possibilities for alternative forms of entertainment to NFL football, the 
NFL properly belongs in the broader "entertainment" market rather than in any of the nar-
rower markets mentioned above. This was recognized by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent from 
denial of certiorari in the NASL case, where he stated: ''The NFL owners are joint ventures 
[sic] who produce a product, professional football, which competes with other forms of en-
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its own devices in determining what action will make it more effi-
cient, more profitable, and its product more marketable. Determina-
tions as to cities in which franchises should be located are analogous 
to a law firm's decision about whether to have a department that 
covers certain areas of the law such as labor. Decisions on whether a 
territory should have one or more than one team should be viewed 
as internal determinations of whether or not competition for fan dol-
lars within one territory will help or hurt the NFL. Since the NFL 
does not have monopoly power in the entertainment market, the 
courts should uphold decisions of this nature even if they fail to pro-
duce the desired efficiencies. The role of the courts should be to de-
termine if a practice is intended to promote efficiencies, not to 
regulate business so that only actions that actually are efficiency pro-
ducing are legal. 157 The decision by the NFL that a city should not 
have two teams that compete with one another can be analogized to 
a decision by a law firm that all tax work should be done in the tax 
department and all labor work in the labor department, even if cer-
tain tax work is brought to the firm by a labor lawyer and certain 
labor work brought by a tax lawyer. The decision to preclude law-
yers in the labor department from, in effect, competing against law-
yers in the tax department when a tax problem arises is intended to 
produce efficiencies and is legal. So, too, a decision that two teams 
should not locate and compete for fans in one territory is intended to 
produce efficiencies and therefore should also be deemed legal. 
The next section of this article will examine a few player-restraint 
cases to show that the practices held illegal in them were actually 
efforts by a single entity to produce efficiencies and thus should have 
been upheld. Given this, the Oakland Raiders and NASL courts' 
reliance upon these cases was misplaced. 
IV. THE PLAYER-RESTRAINT CASES 
The courts in the NASL and Oakland Raiders cases relied on 
several player-restraint cases for the proposition that the NFL con-
sists of multiple entities for section 1 purposes.158 However, neither 
tertainment in the entertainment market." NASL, 103 S. Ct. 499, 500 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari). But see Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Phila-
delphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.Supp. 462, 500-05 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (finding the relevant prod-
uct market to be "major league hockey" where the issue was whether or not the National 
Hockey League was attempting to monopolize the pool of high-quality hockey players and 
exclude the World Hockey League from the market for major league hockey). 
157. See Part I, Sec. A supra. 
158. See NASL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir.) (citing Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 
1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v. ~FL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 
801 (1977); Linseman v. World Hockey Association, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977); Bow-
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the Second Circuit nor the Ninth Circuit, whose rulings were bind-
ing precedent for the NASL and Oakland Raiders courts, respec-
tively, had previously ruled on the single-entity status of the NFL in 
any context.159 Consequently, both courts were free to reject the 
player-restraint cases. Moreover, the reliance placed on the player-
restraint cases was inappropriate because, as this part will illustrate, 
those cases were improperly decided. 
It is worth noting at the outset that in neither theNASL case nor 
the Oakland Raiders case did the NFL press the issue that the 
player-restraint cases were improperly decided insofar as they did 
not find the NFL to be a single entity. 160 Rather, the NFL contended 
in both these actions that the NFL should be deemed a single entity 
under the particular circumstances presented, even though it might 
not be a single entity in other instances such as the player-restraint 
cases. 161 This line of reasoning most likely represented a tactical de-
cision by the NFL that to engage in a broadside attack on the player-
restraint decisions would appear to be a request for total antitrust 
immunity. However, as noted in the introduction to this article, 162 
total antitrust immunity does not follow from a holding that the 
NFL is a single entity whenever it acts. Thus, in retrospect, the 
NFL's failure to make a broad attack on the player-restraint cases 
may have been a tactical error. 
This part will avoid making a similar mistake by examining three 
man v. NFL, 402 F. Supp. 754 (D. Minn. 1975); Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 
1974), affd on other grounds, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979)), 
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 499 (1982); Oakland Raiders, 519 F. Supp. 581, 583 (C.D. Cal. 1981) 
(citing Smith, Mackey, and Kapp), appeal docketed, No. 82-5572 (9th Cir. June 14, 1982). 
159. As one ofits player-restraint cases, the Oakland Raiders court cited Kapp v. NFL, 390 
F. Supp 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), ajfd on other grounds, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 
441 U.S. 907 (1979). 519 F. Supp. at 583. Although the district court in Kapp found that the 
Rozelle Rule, the No-Tampering Rule, and the draft violated section I, no appeal was permit-
ted from that interlocutory decision. The case therefore went to the jury, which found that 
Kapp was not injured by the Sherman Act violations. In the appeal by Kapp, the only anti-
trust issue resolved by the Ninth Circuit was whether the jury instructions that led to the 
finding that Kapp was not damaged were correct. 586 F.2d at 648-50. Consequently, single-
entity antitrust issues were never before the Ninth Circuit in the Kapp case, and the Oakland 
Raiders court was free to rule that the NFL was a single entity. 
160. The NFL did note in passing in the Oakland Raiders case that it believed that Smith 
v. Pro Football, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978), discussed in Part IV, Sec. A iefra, was improp-
erly decided for other reasons. NFL's Brief in Support of Single Entity Theory at 38-41, Oak-
land Raiders, 519 F. Supp. 581 (C.D. Cal. 1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-5572 (9th Cir. June 
14, 1982) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
161. Reply Brief for Cross-Appellant NFL at 10-12, NASL, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 103 S. Ct. 499 (1982) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review); NFL's Brief in 
Support of Single Entity Theory at 38-41, Oakland Raiders, 519 F. Supp. (C.D. Cal. 1981), 
appeal docketed, No. 82-5572 (9th Cir. June 14, 1982) (copy on flle with the Michigan Law 
Review). 
162. See notes 25-26 supra and accompanying text. 
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of the principal player-restraint cases. Each case represents a differ-
ent type of restraint, yet each type of restraint is intended to promote 
economic efficiency. Therefore, the analogy of the NFL to a law 
firm partnership is not merely a smokescreen entitled "single entity" 
behind which the NFL can hide when acting in an anticompetitive 
manner. Rather, it should become clear that the challenged prac-
tices were intended or could be found as intended to promote the 
efficiency of the NFL in producing its product. Consequently, the 
practices challenged in these cases should have been upheld against 
antitrust attack. 
A. Rules Inhibiting Free-Agent Status 
The player-restraint rules, which consist of the draft, the Rozelle 
Rule, and the No-Tampering Rule, can be treated together because 
they have one common goal: the elimination or minimization of 
free-agent status for players.163 While several courts have held that 
these player restraints violate section 1,164 we shall concentrate our 
analysis on Smith v. Pro Football, Inc. , 165 because it is the most re-
cent such case and demonstrates the most sophisticated approach of 
the player-restraint cases. 
The district court in Smith held that the NFL draft in 1968 con-
stituted a classic group boycott and therefore was per se illegal under 
section 1.166 On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of 
Appeals found that the NFL teams were not economic competitors. 
Rather, they were joint venturers working together to produce a sin-
gle product: football games and telecasts. 167 The appeals court fur-
ther found that Smith was not seeking to compete with the NFL 
teams, and any refusal to deal with him did not restrict the output of 
football games.168 Consequently, the draft was not a classic group 
163. See note 16 supra. 
164. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (striking down the draft 
under a Rule of Reason approach); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977) (striking down the Rozelle Rule under a Rule of Reason ap-
proach); Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), qffd. on other grounds, 586 F.2d 644 
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979) (a myriad of player restraints found illegal 
under a Rule of Reason approach). 
165. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
166. Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738, 744 (D.D.C. 1976) affd. in part, revd. in part 
sub nom. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In dicta, the district 
court expressed the belief that the draft would be illegal under a Rule of Reason analysis 
because the NFL could not prove that the draft actually aided the League in reaching the goal 
of competitive balance on the field, and even if it did, it was more restrictive than necessary to 
achieve that goal. 420 F. Supp. at 745-47. 
167. 593 F.2d at 1178-79. 
168. 593 F.2d at 1179. 
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boycott that should be declared per se illegal. 169 The court stated: 
"The draft, indeed, is designed not to insulate the NFL from compe-
tition, but to improve the entertainment product by enhancing its 
teams' competitive equality."170 However, the court used this single-
entity type analysis only to determine whether the draft was per se 
illegal. The court then disregarded its earlier single-entity intimation 
and treated the NFL teams as separate entities in its Rule of Reason 
inquiry. Examination of how the court made this error will demon-
strate why player-mobility restraints should be legal under section 1. 
The appeals court in Smith began its Rule of Reason inquiry by 
stating that it must balance "the 'anticompetitive evils' of the chal-
lenged practice . . . against its 'procompetitive virtues' to ascertain 
whether the former outweighs the latter." 171 This balancing test, 
however, is appropriate only if there are multiple actors for section 1 
purposes. 172 If there are not multiple actors, the inquiry under the 
Sherman Act should be limited to a section 2 inquiry as to whether 
the challenged practice is intended to restrict output. 173 If the prac-
tice is not intended to restrict output, it should be deemed legal. 174 
The Smith court had already suggested not only that the restraint 
was intended to improve the NFL's entertainment product by en-
hancing the teams' competitive equality (i.e., intended to promote 
efficiencies), but also that it did not restrict the output of football 
games. 175 Furthermore, while Smith had alleged a section 2 viola-
tion, neither the district court nor the appeals court treated the case 
as a section 2 case. 176 Consequently, the Smith court's inquiry should 
have ended, and the draft should have been held legal. So long as 
the draft was intended to promote efficiencies in the production of 
football, it should not have been the court's concern whether or not it 
succeeded in that effort. 177 
The appeals court, however, apparently overlooked the fact that 
169. 593 F.2d at 1179-80. The Court observed that "[t]he 'group boycott' designation ••• 
is properly restricted to concerted attempts by competitors to exclude horizontal competitors; it 
should not be applied ... to concerted refusals that are not designed to drive out competitors 
but to achieve some other goal." 593 F.2d at 1179-80 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). As 
Smith was not a horizontal competitor of the NFL teams, their refusal to deal with him on an 
individual basis was not held to consitute a per se illegal boycott. 
170. 593 F.2d at 1179 (footnote omitted). 
171. 593 F.2d at 1183 (footnote omitted). 
172. See note 21 supra. 
173. See note 156 supra. 
174. See Part I, Sec. A supra. 
175. See 593 F.2d at 1179. 
176. 593 F.2d at 1174-75 n.1. 
177. See Part I, Sec. A supra. 
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the district court made two analytical errors. First, the district court 
improperly concerned itself with the actual effect of the draft upon 
playing-field balance. Second, the district court failed to recognize 
that the NFL teams were joint venturers working together to pro-
duce a single product, a recognition that should have led to the con-
clusion that the NFL is a single entity. As a result of its failure to 
note these errors of the district court, the appeals court then made 
several interrelated errors in its own Rule of Reason analysis. 
First, the appeals court unnecessarily devoted an inordinate 
amount of space to demonstrating that the district court had prop-
erly determined from the evidence that the draft was ineffective in 
promoting balance on the field. 178 Second, it examined whether the 
restrictions on competition for rookie players caused by the draft 
could legally be counterbalanced by the promotion of playing-field 
balance that the draft might aid. 179 However, as has already been 
noted, the intimation by the court that the NFL was a single entity 
made it inappropriate for the court to engage in any balancing 
test. ISO 
These first two errors by the appeals court then led to its third 
error: viewing the promotion of playing-field balance as an unac-
ceptable justification for the draft. The court apparently miscon-
strued the NFL's contention that the draft aided in producing more 
interesting football by promoting team balance. The court viewed 
this as a mere contention that the public was better served by high-
quality football. The court then analogized this justification to an 
attempt to justify banning competitive bidding by engineers because 
competitive bidding would harm the public safety by leading to 
shoddy workmanship. The court noted that in National Society of 
Professional Engineers v. United States 181 the Supreme Court specifi-
cally rejected this public-interest justification. 182 The Supreme Court 
held in National Society of Professional Engineers that only justifica-
tions based upon the procompetitive effects or purposes of the chal-
lenged actions would be considered in a Rule of Reason analysis. 183 
The Court stated that well-intentioned social policies that were not 
formulated to promote economic competition could not be consid-
178. 593 F.2d at 1183-85 & n.46. 
179. 593 F.2d at 1186-89. 
180. See notes 166-77 supra and accompanying text. 
181. 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
182. 593 F.2d at 1186-87. 
183. 435 U.S. at 688-92. 
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ered in a Rule of Reason analysis. 184 The Smith appeals court thus 
perceived the promotion of playing-field balance as a non-economic 
justification that was not based upon its effect upon competition. 
This justification could not, therefore, be considered as counterbal-
ancing the anticompetitive effects of the draft on the market for 
rookie players. 185 
The draft, however, operates in conjunction with the other rules 
restraining player mobility to promote balance on the playing field 
and thus aids in producing a more marketable product. Thus, if as 
we have postulated, the teams in the NFL are analogous to depart-
ments in a law firm, a suit to strike down the draft should be as 
unfounded as a suit to require competitive bidding for associates' 
services among the law firm's departments at the end of each fiscal 
year. 186 The only difference is that in challenging the draft, the 
plaintiff is merely attempting to force the law firm to require each 
department to bid against the others for the services of incoming as-
sociates. While a firm could do this if it were so inclined, no court 
would force it to do so even though the lack of bidding restrains the 
market for associates' services. A decision to avoid competitive bid-
ding among law firm departments can be viewed as an effort to mini-
mize internal dissension that could damage the ultimate legal 
product of the firm. The firm, however, does not act to produce a 
better legal product simply because a better legal product is a social 
good. It acts to produce a better legal product so that it can compete 
more effectively for legal business. 
Similarly, the NFL does not conduct a draft because it believes 
that high-quality football is a social good (as the Smith court con-
tended). Rather, it conducts a draft because it believes that it must 
produce high-quality football to compete effectively against other 
sports for sports fans' dollars, 187 and against other forms of en-
tertainment for network television dollars. The Smit/1 court's con-
clusion that the draft impermissibly restrained competition in the 
player market reflects a failure to carry the single-entity finding to its 
logical and proper conclusion. Once the court regarded the NFL as 
a single entity, it should have found that any restraint on the player 
market caused by the draft was ancillary to the overall legal agree-
ment of the teams to act together to produce high-quality football. 
184. 435 U.S. at 693-96. 
185. See 593 F.2d at 1186-89. 
186. See text accompanying notes 21-22 sttpra. 
187. For an excellent student work that reaches a similar conclusion via a slightly different 
route, see Note,sttpra note 111, at 554-61. 
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Such a restraint is just as legal as an internal decision by a law firm 
on how to assign associates to various departments. Furthermore, 
after intimating that the NFL was a single entity that produced foot-
ball, the court should have recognized that the promotion of team 
balance was not a non-economically motivated social good, but 
rather an economically motivated attempt by the League to compete 
better for the entertainment dollar. 
One last aspect of Smith that reflects a concern common to all 
player-mobility-restraint cases deserves attention. The appeals court 
stated: 
The trial judge was likewise correct in finding that the draft was 
significantly anticompetitive in its effect. The draft inescapably forces 
each seller of football services to deal with one, and only one buyer, 
robbing the seller, as in any monopsonistic market, of any real bar-
gaining power. The draft, as the District Court found, "leaves no room 
whatever for competition among the teams for the services of college 
players, and utterly strips them of any measure of control over the 
marketing of their talents." 188 
Thus, if the draft (and other player-mobility restraints) had been up-
held, top athletes desiring to play NFL football would have faced 
take-it-or-leave-it offers, since there were no competing football 
leagues at that time. As top-rank attorneys desiring to practice in a 
major national law firm have many firms to choose from, it might 
appear that the analogy of the NFL to a law firm breaks down when 
viewed from the players' (associates') viewpoint. While the players' 
situation may generate more sympathy than that of the associates, it 
is no different when viewed from an antitrust perspective. 
Under the antitrust laws, a monopoly can be lawful if it is law-
fully obtained and if the monopoly power is not used to tighten the 
monopolist's hold on the market. Only the act of monopolization, 
which excludes obtaining a monopoly by legal means, is outlawed. 189 
We permit legal monopolies because we assume that if they are ob-
tained legally, they produce some efficiencies that counterbalance 
the dead-weight loss that they cause. Consequently, when a monop-
olist buys goods and services as a monopsonist, the law does not re-
strict the monopsonist's freedom to structure its buying as it pleases 
because restrictions might injure the efficiencies obtained.190 Thus, 
188. 593 F.2d at 1185 (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted). 
189. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 21, § 7, at 29-30. 
190. This statement assumes that the monopolist is not offering terms and conditions that 
would illegally strengthen its hold on the market. For example, it assumes that the monopolist 
is not telling his supplier: "If a company arises to compete against me, and you deal with it, I 
will never deal with you again." These terms and conditions might violate section 2, but no 
such blacklisting or sinillar practice was alleged in any of the NFL player-restraint cases that 
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if a business is established for the sole purpose of providing goods 
and services to a legal monopoly, that business does not have a valid 
antitrust claim against the monopoly merely because it cannot sell its 
good and services elsewhere and must accept what the monopolist 
offers. 191 
Prior to the merger of the American Football League (AFL) and 
the NFL, football players could choose between two buyers. If not 
satisfied with the offer received from a team in one league, a player 
could negotiate with a team in the other league. In 1966, Congress 
enacted a law that immunized from antitrust attack the merger by 
which the AFL and NFL combined to form a new, expanded 
NFL.192 The conference committee report on the merger bill indi-
cates that it "would not extend to the combined league any greater 
antitrust immunity than that now existing for the existing profes-
sional football leagues" and that its "sole effect . . . is to permit the 
combination of the two leagues to go forward without fear of anti-
trust challenge .... " 193 However, the full ramifications of this 
statement 'Yere unclear. Indeed, Representative Celler, Chairman of 
the House Judiciary Committee, believed that the bill might have 
far-reaching effects, including the authorization of a single draft that 
would leave the players faced with a monopsonistic market. 194 Since 
Congress authorized the AFL-NFL merger after being informed that 
it might be authorizing a monopsonistic players' market, the present 
NFL should be treated like a legal monopoly. 195 The football play-
ers should be treated like providers of goods and services to a legal 
monopoly who cannot complain when they dislike the terms offered 
were decided on the merits. q: Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (arose out of an allega• 
tion that NFL was blacklisting players who had played for a competing league, but only ad-
dressed the issue of whether football was exempt from the antitrust laws). 
191. See, e.g., Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. de-
m"ed, 450 U.S. 917 (1981) (company with a monopoly on the publication of airline schedules 
did not violate section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982), by 
refusing to publish certain connecting schedules of co=uter airlines, even though these air-
lines were placed at a significant competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis airlines whose schedules 
were published). 
192. 15 u.s.c. § 1291 (1982). 
193. H.R. REP. No. 2308, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CooE CONG. & 
Ao. NEWS 4372, 4378. 
194. 112 CONG. REC. 28,231 (1966) (statement of Rep. Celler). 
195. The market for player services discussed here, in which the NFL exercised monopoly 
(monopsony) power from the time of the AFL-NFL merger until at least the recent formation 
of the United States Football League, should be distinguished from the market for entertain-
ment discussed earlier, in which the NFL competes with other forms of entertainment. See 
note 156 supra and accompanying text. The NFL has neither monopoly power nor immunity 
from the antitrust laws in the entertainment market. See id. 
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by the monopoly. 196 While this result may appear harsh, the football 
player should be treated like the businessman who has made a busi-
ness decision to provide goods and services to a legal monopoly. 
The football player may dislike this result, but the antitrust laws 
should not be his source of relief. Instead, he should seek relief 
through the collective bargaining process. 
B. The Four-Or-Five-Year Rule 
The NFL Constitution and By-Laws prohibit any person who 
has played college football from playing in the NFL until his college 
eligibility has expired, he has received a college diploma, or five 
years have elapsed since he first attended college. 197 They also pro-
hibit any person who has never played college football from playing 
in the NFL until four football seasons have elapsed since he first 
attended college.198 This rule prevents outstanding college football 
players from playing in the NFL until their college eligibility has 
expired. While this provision of the NFL Constitution and By-Laws 
has never been challenged, a similar provision of the National Bas-
ketball Association (NBA) by-laws was found to violate Sherman 
Act § 1 in .Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc. 199 (hereinaf-
ter referred to as the Haywood case, because it involved a challenge 
by Spencer Haywood). 
At the time of the Haywood suit, the NBA by-laws prohibited a 
person from playing in the NBA until four years_ after his high 
school class had graduated.200 The American Basketball Association 
196. Congress has statutorily authorized only the merger of two competing football 
leagues. See 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). Thus, the analysis presented in the text is inapplicable 
to other sports leagues. It cannot be used in another sport that has only one bidder for players' 
services after one of two competing leagues has folded and the surviving league has granted 
franchises to some teams in the failing league. 
Nevertheless, the surviving league in this situation should still be treated as a single entity. 
The proper question is whether or not the surviving league attained its monopoly (monopsony) 
legally. If it did, any player-mobility restraints should be held legal unless they are used to 
maintain the league's monopoly (monopsony) position. In other words, player-mobility re-
straints should be examined as a Sherman Act § 2 issue rather than as a Sherman Act § l issue, 
unless it can be demonstrated that the monopoly (monopsony) resulted from an agreement 
between the two competing leagues to merge with the intent to effectuate a common draft and 
eliminate bidding wars. Furthermore, even if section I were then applicable, the merger and 
resulting player-mobility restraints should not be declared illegal until after an inquiry is made 
into whether or not the dead-weight loss caused by the monopoly (monopsony) is outweighed 
by certain efficiencies. See text accompanying notes 35 and 190 supra. 
197. NFL CONST. AND BY-LAWS art. XII,§ 12.l(A) (1976). 
198. NFL CONST. AND BY-LAWS art. XII,§ 12.l(A) (1976). The NFL Constitution and 
By-Laws do not explicitly address the eligibility of players who never attended college. 
199. 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
200. 325 F. Supp. at 1055, 1060. 
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(ABA) had a similar rule, but waived it in "hardship" cases.201 After 
receiving a hardship waiver, Haywood joined the Denver Rockets of 
the ABA two years after he had graduated from high school. Hay-
wood played for one year in the ABA, during which time he attained 
superstar status by earning both the "Rookie of the Year" and "Most 
Valuable Player" awards.202 After that one year, however, Haywood 
alleged that his contract with Denver was invalid because it had 
been obtained by fraud. Haywood then signed a contract to play 
with the Seattle Supersonics of the NBA.203 Because that contract 
violated the NBA's four-year rule, Haywood sued for an order de-
claring that the four-year rule violated section 1. 
The court found the four-year rule to be a group boycott per se 
violative of section 1,204 implicitly holding that the NBA teams were 
multiple actors for purposes of section 1 even though it never specifi-
cally addressed this issue. In rejecting a Rule of Reason approach, 
the court refused to consider whether the four-year rule promoted 
the efficient operation of the NBA by strengthening college basket-
ball so that the NBA could forego developing a farm system.205 This 
refusal to consider whether the four-year rule could promote this 
type of efficiency demonstrates the court's lack of understanding of 
antitrust policy. 
Had the court in Haywood understood the proper goal of anti-
trust policy, it could have found that the NBA was as much a single 
entity as the NFL. Like the NFL teams, who cooperate in the pro-
duction of a unique "product," NFL football, the NBA teams pro-
duce a single "product," NBA basketball, that each could not 
produce alone or in a different league. Furthermore, the Haywood 
court could have found that the four-year rule was the result of an 
internal decision intended to promote efficiencies within the NBA by 
strengthening college basketball as a farm system so that the NBA 
need not develop its own farm system. This finding should have re-
sulted in a holding that the rule was legal. 
The four-year rule could strengthen college basketball by keep-
ing the best college players in college basketball. Consequently, the 
level of play in college basketball could rise, and the skills of all 
201. See 325 F. Supp. at 1060. 
202. 325 F. Supp. at 1060. 
203. 325 F. Supp. at 1054. 
204. 325 F. Supp. at 1066. Unlike the court in Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 
(D.C. Cir. 1978), the Haywood court failed to appreciate the difference between the situation it 
faced and a classic group boycott. See note 169 supra and accompanying text. 
205. 325 F. Supp. at 1066. 
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college basketball players training for the NBA would be better 
honed. The four-year rule was imperfect because it temporarily ex-
cluded players who for one reason or another never attended college. 
It also forced players prepared for NBA competition to remain in the 
farm system longer than necessary. Nevertheless, these imperfec-
tions should not have changed the outcome. The NBA may have 
decided that it was more efficient to use a blanket rule with these 
imperfections than to operate on a case-by-case basis as a hardship 
exemption would require. Under a consumer wealth maximization 
approach to antitrust, the courts should not direct the NBA how to 
structure its business operations.206 If the imperfections in such a 
rule are significant, a rival league without such a rule (such as the 
ABA) might arise to sign gifted players like Spencer Haywood 
should the NBA refuse to do so. If many such players were signed 
by a rival league, the market would force the NBA either to change 
its rule or suffer a decline in the quality of its product. As with the 
player-mobility restraints, the result might appear to be harsh on 
promising young athletes, but principled enforcement of antitrust 
policy demands this result. 
It should be noted that active players affected by player-mobility 
restraints can achieve their goals through collective bargaining. It is 
unlikely, however, that players ineligible due to the four-year rule 
could cause the rule to be changed through collective bargaining. 
Because they are not yet eligible to play in the league, they are not 
members of a players' union. Furthermore, it is not in the interest of 
the players' union to amend the rule. The four-year rule provides 
some job security for active marginal players who might face an ear-
lier retirement if the restriction were lifted to allow gifted players to 
enter the league at an earlier date. 
In light of this fact, Haywood could have alleged that the four-
year rule was not actually intended to produce efficiencies, but was 
the result of a conspiracy between the players' union and the owners 
to protect marginal players. If he had proved this allegation, the 
multiplicity of actors required for section 1 would have been present, 
and a section 1 violation might properly have been found.207 Fur-
206. See Part I, Sec. A. 
207. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that an action that would otherwise 
violate the antitrust laws is immune from antitrust attack if it is incorporated into a collective 
bargaining agreement and primarily affects only the parties to the agreement. See McCourt v. 
California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1197-98 (6th Cir. 1979) (citing Mackey v. NFL, 543 
F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977)). However, the four-year 
rule seems primarily to affect college players who are not parties to any collective bargaining 
agreement. Thus, even if it were made part of a collective bargaining agreement between the 
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thermore, Haywood could have alleged that the NBA had formu-
lated its four-year rule in an agreement with the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association (NCAA) to protect the NCAA's interests in re-
taining the best college players. Ifhe had proved such an allegation, 
the requisite plurality of actors would have been present, and a sec-
tion 1 violation could have been found. However, because neither of 
these allegations was apparently made or proved in the Haywood 
case, the finding of a section 1 violation cannot be justified.208 There-
fore, any reliance on a four-or-five-year-rule case to find multiple 
entities within a sports league is misplaced. 
C. Roster Limitation And Player-Acquisition .Deadline 
The NFL limits the number of players that any team may carry 
on its roster.209 It also prohibits teams from trading players after the 
season is a certain number of weeks old.210 Additional restrictions 
limit the ability of teams to add players to their rosters during the 
season.211 While players or prospective players might contend that 
these rules constitute an agreement among the teams to limit job op-
portunities for players, Weistart and Lowell properly find these re-
straints to be reasonably related to the NFL's goal of producing a 
marketable product. They state: 
The apparent purpose of such rules is to promote the equality of com-
petition by controlling the clubs' access to playing talent during the 
playing season. If clubs could freely add players, early season games 
would lose their significance, and the race for the championship would 
lose much of its appeal.212 
owners and the players' union, the four-year rule would not appear to qualify for antitrust 
immunity under the standard set forth in McCourt. 
208. A similar critique can be made of Linseman v. World Hockey Assn., 439 F. Supp. 
1315 (D. Conn. 1977), in which the World Hockey Association (WHA) was preliminarily en-
joined from enforcing a rule that prohibited persons under the age of twenty from playing in 
the league. The court found the rule to be a group boycott by the WHA's member teams and 
found the case to be indistinguishable from Haywood. 439 F. Supp. at 1326. However, while 
the Lins,eman court may have made the same mistakes as the Haywood court in not realizing 
that the WHA was a single entity, the result in Linseman may be correct. In Linseman, unlike 
Haywood, evidence indicated that the WHA intended the rule to protect and strengthen Cana-
dian amateur hockey, which acted as a farm system for the WHA. 439 F. Supp. at 1322. The 
WHA also promulgated and enforced the rule at the insistence of the Canadian Amateur 
Hockey Association (CAHA). The CAHA was able to demand such cooperation from the 
WHA because the CAHA could prevent the WHA from entering lucrative contracts for WHA 
teams to compete against European teams which toured Canada. 439 F. Supp. at 1318, 1325. 
It therefore appears that the WHA and the CAHA constituted the requisite plurality of actors 
for section I purposes. 
209. NFL CONST. AND BY-LAWS art. XVII,§ 17.1 (1976 & Supp. 1982). 
210. NFL CONST. AND BY-LAWS art. XVI, § 16.6 (1976). 
211. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 5.0S(b), at 634 (1979). 
212. Id. 
October 1983] NFL and Section 1 of the Sherman Act _47 
Although Weistart and Lowell do not argue that the NFL should be 
deemed a single entity with respect to this issue, their analysis of the 
rationale for the rule is compatible with a single-entity analysis. 
Bowman v. National Football League,213 cited with approval by 
the NASL court in holding that the NFL consisted of multiple ac-
tors,214 involved a variation on the typical roster limitation and 
player-acquisition deadline. Bowman arose as a result of the demise 
of the World Football League (WFL). It became apparent part of 
the way through the 1975 NFL season that the WFL would fold. At 
that time, the NFL teams agreed, for the 1975 season only, not to 
sign players who had any remaining contractual obligations to a 
WFL team.215 They also agreed that players who had played in the 
WFL in 1975, but had no further contractual obligations to the WFL 
or to any of its teams, could not be signed by an NFL team after 
October 24, 1975.216 The district court preliminarily enjoined the 
NFL from enforcing this agreement. 
In an opinion almost totally bereft of any legal analysis, the dis-
trict court in Bowman found it likely that the plaintiffs could prove 
that the defendant teams were engaging in a group boycott.217 In-
stead, the court should have recognized the NFL as a single entity. 
Then, the court's only inquiry should have been, pursuant to Sher-
man Act § 2, whether or not the challenged policy was intended to 
restrict output or was intended to promote efficiencies within the 
League that would enhance its product. Just as the court in Smith v. 
Pro Football, Inc. 218 had found that player-mobility restraints did 
not restrict the output of football games,219 the court in Bowman 
could have found that the restraints in hiring former WFL players 
did not restrict the output of football games. The restraints lasted 
only for the duration of the 1975 season. Thus, the restraints did not 
constitute a predatory practice intended to inform NFL players that 
they would be blacklisted if they played for a rival league. On the 
213. 402 F. Supp. 754 (D. Minn. 1975). 
214. NASL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 499 (1982). 
215. 402 F. Supp. at 755. 
216. 402 F. Supp. at 755. The signing deadline originally corresponded to the NFL's trad-
ing deadline of October 28, 1975, but was moved up, apparently in an attempt to avoid 
threatened litigation by a WFL franchise owner who wanted his franchise accepted into the 
NFL. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 211, § 5.08(b), at 635; see also 402 F. Supp. at 
755. 
217. 402 F. Supp. at 756. 
218. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
219. See note 175 supra and accompanying text.· 
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contrary, the evidence indicated that the hiring restraints were in-
tended to promote efficiencies within the League. The court stated: 
NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle testified at the hearing and said the 
action of the defendants was taken to prevent threatened litigation by a 
WFL franchise holder if former WFL players were engaged and also 
so as not to disturb the competitive balance between the NFL teams in 
midseason. He also said many of the WFL players had formerly 
played in the NFL and there are contract rights to them in some NFL 
clubs and that working out the claims of these clubs would be a diffi-
cult and time-consuming job, especially if undertaken in midseason.220 
The court not only failed to note any evidence rebutting Rozelle's 
testimony, but also stated: "There is no dispute as to the facts."221 
Apparently, however, the court did not deem this uncontroverted ev-
idence of intended efficiencies as relevant to whether an antitrust vi-
olation might have occurred. This failure to recognize the relevance 
of intended efficiencies evidences the court's failure to understand 
the policy that should guide antitrust enforcement. 
Viewed in their proper perspective, the restraints on hiring for-
mer WFL players should have been upheld. The restraints were an 
effort by a single entity to minimize the negative effects that the de-
mise of a competing business could have on the surviving business. 
Reasonable action taken with the intent to avoid litigation instituted 
by the dying business should not be condemned. Nothing could be 
more reasonable than deciding not to hire employees of a moribund 
competitor unless one is certain that those employees have no further 
contractual obligations to that competitor. Furthermore, the Octo-
ber 24, 1975, deadline on hiring former WFL players not contractu-
ally obligated to a WFL team was probably needed to maintain the 
competitive balance that the trading deadline was intended to pro-
mote. 222 Weistart and Lowell note that the NFL's position was 
somewhat undermined by the League's failure to prohibit the late-
season signing of free agents who were not associated with the WFL 
during its 1975 season. They correctly add, however, that a late-sea-
son influx of numerous top-quality, well-conditioned WFL players 
could have more significantly upset the competitive balance that the 
NFL had established than would the occasional signing of a free 
agent who had not recently been playing professional football.223 
Such an influx of well-conditioned WFL players could have dam-
aged both the integrity of the NFL and the marketability of its prod-
220. 402 F. Supp. at 755-56. 
221. 402 F. Supp. at 755. 
222. See notes 220-21 supra and accompanying text. 
223. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 211, § 5.08(b), at 638. 
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uct. Given the Bowman court's failure to analyze NFL operations in 
the context of proper antitrust policy, the Bowman case is not persua-
sive precedent for holding that the teams of the NFL constitute mul-
tiple actors for purposes of section 1. 
V. THE MISUSE OF PRECEDENT AND MISAPPLICATION OF 
ANTITRUST POLICY IN THE OAKLAND RAIDERS AND 
NASL OPINIONS 
Most of the factors relied upon by the Oakland Raiders and 
NASL courts to hold that the NFL consists of multiple actors have 
been critically examined in earlier parts of this article. As already 
noted in Part IV, the NFL failed to argue that the player-restraint 
cases used by the Oakland Raiders and NASL courts to bolster their 
multiple-entity findings were wrongly decided,224 as is posited by 
this article. However, many of the points raised in Parts II and III 
pertaining to the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine and the similar-
ities between the NFL and a law firm partnership, respectively, were 
raised by the NFL in both actions, albeit without extensive elabora-
tion.225 Because the Oakland Raiders and NASL courts ignored 
these arguments, one wonders whether each court strove to find mul-
tiple entities for reasons unrelated to antitrust enforcement policy. 
The supposition that each court was engaged in result-oriented opin-
ion writing is supported by the additional fact that each opinion mis-
used precedent to support its conclusion. This part will examine this 
misuse of precedent and discuss why the practice struck down in 
each case should have been upheld as designed to promote 
efficiencies. 
A. The Oakland Raiders Case 
In holding that the NFL was not a single entity in the Oakland 
Raiders case, the court relied on or attempted to distinguish three 
cases in addition to the Associated Press case discussed earlier. 226 
These were Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,227 San Francisco 
Seals, Ltd v. National Hockey League ,228 and Knutson v. Daily Re-
224. See note 160 supra and accompanying text. 
225. See generally Reply Brief for Cross-Appellant NFL, NASL, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 499 (1982) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review); NFL's Brief in 
Support of Single Entity Theory, Oakland Raiders, 519 F. Supp. 581 (C.D. Cal. 1981), appeal 
docketed, No. 82-5572 (9th Cir. June 14, 1982) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
226. See notes 98-104 supra and accompanying text. 
227. 373 U.S. 341 (1963). 
228. 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974). 
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view, Inc. 229 The court's treatment of each of these three cases is 
disconcerting when examined carefully. 
Associated Press was used by the Oakland Raiders court for the 
proposition that members of an organization that produces a unitary 
product can nonetheless be multiple actors for purposes of section 1 
of the Sherman Act.230 As already noted, though, the precedential 
value of Associated Press has been undermined by the Supreme 
Court's more recent ruling in the Broadcast Music case.231 In addi-
tion, however, the Oakland Raiders court relied on Silver v. New 
York Stock Exchange232 for the same proposition, stating: 
Likewise, in Silver, [373 U.S. at 365] ... the Court held that the Ex-
change had violated section I of the Sherman Act. Yet the Exchange 
"perform[ed] an important function" by "serv[ing] . . . as an indispen-
sable mechanism through which corporate securities can be bought 
and sold" - a function that none of its individual broker-members 
could perform on its own. Id at 349.233 
Even though the court did not place the phrase, "a function that 
none of its individual broker-members could perform on its own," in 
quotation marks, its use of that phrase, combined with its placement 
of the citation to a page in the reports immediately after that phrase, 
strongly suggests that the opinion paraphrased the language of the 
Supreme Court. However, this is an improper interpretation of Sil-
ver. In Silver, the Court's statement was: "Stock exchanges perform 
an important function in the economic life of this country. They 
serve, first of all, as an indispensable mechanism through which cor-
porate securities can be bought and sold[,] ... [thereby] facilitating 
the successful marshaling of large aggregations of funds that would 
otherwise be extremely difficult of access."234 However, the Court 
made this statement to reconcile congressionally authorized self-reg-
ulation by stock exchanges with the potential anticompetitive effects 
in contravention of antitrust policy that such self-regulation might 
have. The Court did not make this statement, as the Oakland Raid-
ers opinion implies, to find that the New York Stock Exchange pro-
duced a service or product that each of its members could not 
produce on its own. Indeed, while Justice Frankfurter, in hisAssoci-
229. 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977). 
230. Oakland Raiders, 519 F. Supp. 581, 583 (C.D. Cal. 1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-
5572 (9th Cir. June 14, 1982). 
231. See notes 86-104 supra and accompanying text. 
232. 373 U.S. 341 (1963). 
233. 519 F. Supp. at 583-84 (quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 
349 (1963) (brackets in original)). 
234. 373 U.S. at 349. 
October 1983) NFL and Section 1 of the Sherman Act 51 
ated Press concurrence, and Justices Roberts and Murphy, in their 
dissents in that same case, either expressly stated or strongly inti-
mated that the Associated Press produced a product that its members 
could not produce on their own,235 such an intimation is absent from 
the Silver opinion with respect to stock exchanges. Moreover, the 
issue was not raised in any briefs before the Supreme Court in Silver. 
While the Oakland Raiders court's conclusion that a stock exchange 
produces a service or product that each of its members cannot pro-
duce on its own may be true, the implication that Silver addressed 
that issue is unwarranted. 
The Oakland Raiders court's attempt to distinguish the second 
case cited, San Francisco Seals, Ltd v. National Hockey League,236 
is misleading and unconvincing. San Francisco Seals, which was de-
cided by the same district court that decided the Oakland Raiders 
case, presented essentially the same issue as that case. Consequently, 
the Oakland Raiders court should have relied on San Francisco Seals 
and ruled that the NFL is a single entity. 
In San Francisco Seals, the San Francisco Seals sued the Na-
tional Hockey League (NHL) under section 1 of the Sherman Act 
after the NHL Board of Governors denied the Seals' request to move 
the franchise from San Francisco to Vancouver. The San Francisco 
Seals court granted summary judgment for the NHL by holding the 
NHL to be a single entity. Vancouver, unlike Los Angeles, which 
already had an NFL team, 237 had no NHL team at the time. The 
Oakland Raiders court emphasized this fact in its attempt to distin-
guish San Francisco Seals by stating: "San Francisco Seals turned 
on a finding that denial of the Seals' proposed move to Vancouver 
had no anticompetitive effect. That finding cannot automatically be 
transferred to this case, because the Seals, unlike the Raiders here, 
were not being prevented from moving into another team's home 
territory."238 
The San Francisco Seals court's decision did not, however, 
"tum□ on a finding that denial of the Seals' proposed move to Van-
couver had no anticompetitive effect." Rather, in a decision that is 
unusual because it represents a rare example of proper economic 
analysis under the antitrust laws, the San Francisco Seals court 
based its decision on a finding that the NHL was a single entity and 
235. See 326 U.S. at 26 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); 326 U.S. at 31 (Roberts, J., dissent-
ing); 326 U.S. at 50 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
236. 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974). 
237. The Los Angeles Rams. 
238. 519 F. Supp. at 585. 
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thus the requisite plurality of actors for a section 1 violation was 
missing.239 The court found that the NHL teams were not economic 
competitors; rather, they were "acting together as one single business 
enterprise, competing against other similarly organized professional 
leagues."240 The only factual distinction between the San Francisco 
Seals case and the Oakland Raiders case is that the NHL Constitu-
tion precluded there being more than one team in one city,241 while 
the NFL Constitution and By-Laws did not. However, to use that 
factual difference to distinguish the anti-competitive effect of the 
leagues' actions in the two cases makes a mockery of the section 1 
violation that was found in the Oakland Raiders case. If this distinc-
tion were taken to its logical conclusion, the NFL would have fared 
better if it had precluded the possibility of any economic competition 
between teams by permitting only one team per city as the NHL did, 
rather than allowing competition by permitting more than one team 
in the same city if three-fourths of the teams agreed to that arrange-
ment.242 Such a holding would tum antitrust policy on its head by 
upholding a total ban on competition while outlawing only a partial 
restraint. 243 
The Oakland Raiders court saved its most lamentable misuse of 
precedent for its analysis of the Ninth Circuit's treatment of the in-
traenterprise conspiracy doctrine. The court stated: 
The Ninth Circuit has taken a[n] ... unreceptive view of single-
entity claims, as demonstrated by Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc. . . . . 
The defendants there were two newspaper-publishing corporations, 
one a wholly-owned subsidiary of the other. The Ninth Circuit was 
reluctant to characterize these firms as a single entity for Sherman Act 
purposes, stating only (in dictum) that they were "[a]rguably" one en-
terprise. Yet not only were the two firms parent and subisidary, but 
one individual had control of the parent, was president of both corpo-
rations, and published all of both companies' newspapers. Moreover, 
the firms shared many key personnel, their newspapers exhibited nu-
merous common features, and the two companies did not compete. If 
all these features together were insufficient to establish a single enter-
prise, it is difficult to see how the NFL can constitute a single entity 
239. 379 F. Supp. at 969-70. 
240. 379 F. Supp. at 969. 
241. See 379 F. Supp. at 967-68 (quoting relevant provisions of the NHL Constitution). 
242. NFL CONST. AND BY-LAWS art. IV, § 4.3 (Supp. 1982). 
243. In the preceding several sentences, the term "competition" has not been used as the 
word of art that it is intended to be under a consumer wealth maximization approach to the 
antitrust laws. Rather, it has been used as it was used by the court in the Oakland Raiders 
case, which assumed that because two NFL teams may both vie for the same fans' dollars, they 
are not part of one business entity for antitrust purposes. 
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when it possesses none of those features.244 
How the Oakland Raiders court could state that the Ninth Circuit 
takes an "unreceptive view of single-entity claims" based upon Knut-
son v. Daily Review, Inc. 245 is perplexing. While the Knutson court's 
statement that "[a]rguably on these facts the two corporate units 
were incapable of conspiracy as a matter of law"246 may have been 
merely dictum, the Knutson court followed that language with: "It is 
unnecessary for us to decide that question, however, because the 
same facts prevent successful attack on the district court's factual 
findings that there was no conspiracy."247 The presence of this sec-
ond sentence is somewhat confusing. The Knutson court noted that 
one Sparks, who controlled both corporations, made all the decisions 
that led to the alleged conspiracy.248 However, the Knutson court 
also noted that there were "facts" (plural) that supported the conclu-
sion that no conspiracy existed.249 Here, the Knutson court was ap-
parently looking to all the facts and circumstances, rather than only 
to the fact that Sparks made all the decisions, in determining that a 
conspiracy did not exist. In effect, while not specifically saying so, 
the Knutson court applied the same test to determine whether a con-
spiracy existed as it would apply to determine whether a single entity 
was acting. This is a proper analysis of the problem, because the 
question of whether or not a conspiracy took place, like the question 
of whether or not a single entity exists, must often be answered by 
examining the economic realities of the situation. 
Viewed in this light, Knutson supports an all-the-facts-and-cir-
cumstances approach to the single-entity issue. Contrary to the dis-
trict court's statement in Oakland Raiders, the Ninth Circuit is 
considered to be in the forefront of adopting an all-the-facts-and-
circumstances test for the single-entity issue, and Knutson is consid-
ered the leading case representing this approach. 250 Even counsel 
for the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission, who argued in 
Oakland Raiders for the finding that the NFL teams are multiple 
entities for section 1 purposes, have recognized that the Ninth Cir-
cuit is a "leading exponent" of the view that "separate incorporation 
244. 519 F. Supp. at 582-83 (emphasis in original) (brackets in original) (citation omitted) 
(footnote omitted). 
245. 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977). 
246. 548 F.2d at 803. 
247. 548 F.2d at 803. 
248. See 548 F.2d at 801. 
249. 548 F.2d at 803. 
250. See, e.g., Handler & Smart, supra note 61, at 38-39, 55-57; see also Note, Conspiring 
Entities, supra note 78, at 670. 
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. often is a mere technicality which should have little significance, 
or certainly not conclusive significance, in determining the reach of 
the antitrust laws."251 They further acknowledged that Knutson is a 
leading case in this area and have struggled to limit its e.ffect.252 The 
Oakland Raiders court's contention that Knutson represents the 
Ninth Circuit's rejection of single-entity claims is therefore unsub-
stantiated and suggests that the opinion is improperly result-
oriented. 
If the Oakland Raiders court had properly viewed the NFL as a 
single entity, it could easily have determined that a decision to place 
two teams in the Oakland-San Francisco area and only one in the 
Los Angeles area was an internal decision that was not intended to 
restrict the output of football. That decision must therefore have 
been intended to promote the efficient operation of the League by 
placing teams in optimum locations. Even if the allocation of two 
teams in Oakland-San Francisco and only one in Los Angeles was 
not as optimal as the opposite allocation, the court should not have 
intervened. Rather, it should have allowed the NFL either to correct 
the misallocation or suffer the economic consequences.253 
B. The NASL Case 
The district court in the NASL case observed that previous cases 
had held the NFL to be a single entity when ''joint league conduct 
neither implicates nor impinges upon competition between the mem-
ber clubs."254 Because the NFL's proposed cross-ownership ban did 
not implicate or impinge upon competition among NFL teams, the 
district court found the single-entity defense to be available and dis-
missed the complaint.255 The district court did not believe that the 
NFL could be a single entity in cases involving player-mobility re-
straints because it believed that NFL teams compete against each 
251. Blecher & Daniels, supra note 66, at 226. 
252. Id. at 227-32. 
253. Even if it were alleged that the Raiders were denied permission to move to Los Ange-
les not because of an intent to promote efficiences, but rather out of a dislike for Raider owner 
Al Davis, that allegation should not give rise to a valid antitrust claim. While a dislike for Al 
Davis may have some effect on how certain owners would vote on the move, the consumer 
wealth maximization model presupposes that businessmen make decisions out of a desire to 
maximize profits, not out of a desire to satisfy some personal grudge. If decisions that are 
foolish from an efficiency standpoint are made because of personal grudges, market forces, 
rather than courts, should correct the decisions. See Part I, Sec. A supra. 
254. NASL, 505 F. Supp. 659, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), revd., 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 103 S. Ct. 499 (1982). 
255. 505 F. Supp. at 677, 689. 
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other for players.256 Also, it did not believe that the NFL could be a 
single entity in an Oakland Raiders-type case because two teams in 
one geographic area compete against each other for fans' dollars.257 
The district court's position with respect to player-mobility-restraint 
cases and playing-site cases, such as the Oakland Raiders case, was 
erroneous. It most likely resulted from the NFL's tactical decision 
not to attack those cases.258 However, its conclusion with respect to 
the cross-ownership ban represented a move in the right direction. 
The Second Circuit, in reversing the district court, disagreed with 
the district court's contention that all cases in which the NFL teams 
were found to be multiple entities involved competition between the 
teams. The Second Circuit stated: 
Although many involved player relations or playing sites, which affect 
competition between member teams, at least one raised issues between 
leagues. In Radovich v. National Football League ,[259] ••• the issue 
was whether an NFL boycott of a player who had previously accepted 
employment with a competing pro-football league, the All America 
Conference, violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court held in 
Radovich that it did, even though that boycott might not, in the words 
of the district court, "implicate [or] impinge[] upon competition be-
tween member clubs. "26° 
This statement inaccurately represents the Supreme Court's holding 
in Radovich. Radovich alleged both section 1 and section 2 viola-
tions by the NFL, claiming "a conspiracy to monopolize and control 
organized professional football in the United States"261 by blacklist-
ing players who played for a competing league. In reality, Radovich 
alleged that the NFL teams conspired not only among themselves, 
but also with a third affiliated league to extend the coverage of the 
blacklist.262 Not enough facts were presented in the Radovich opin-
ion for an intelligent decision to be made as to whether this third 
league could constitute an entity separate from the NFL for section 1 
purposes. However, the allegation of a conspiracy with this third 
league made it inappropriate for the Second Circuit to imply that 
Radovich found the NFL itself to be composed of multiple entities 
for section 1 purposes. 
256. 505 F. Supp. at 677. 
257. 505 F. Supp. at 677. 
258. See notes 160-61 supra and accompanying text. 
259. 352 U.S. 445 (1957). 
260. NASL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir.) (quoting NASL, 505 F. Supp. at 677) (brackets 
in original) (footnote added), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 499 (1982). 
261. 352 U.S. at 447. 
262. See 352 U.S. at 448 (a Pacific Coast League team allegedly refused to hire Radovich 
as a player-coach after being advised of the NFL blacklisting of him). 
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Furthermore, Radovich was an appeal from a dismissal at the 
pleading stage, which was granted on the ground that football, like 
baseball, is immune from the antitrust laws. Thus, the only issue 
before the Court in Radovich was whether football is subject to the 
antitrust laws.263 Indeed, after holding that football is subject to the 
antitrust laws, the Court stated: "Of course, we express no opinion as 
to whether or not respondents have, in fact, violated the antitrust 
laws, leaving that determination to the trial court after all the facts 
are in."264 Earlier language in Radovich to the effect that the com-
plaint made sufficient allegations to make out a claim of conspir-
acy265 cannot be taken as approval on the merits of a 
characterization of the NFL teams as multiple entities, especially in 
view of the allegation that the NFL conspired with a third league. 
Neither can the fact that the NFL claimed in its brief that it should 
be deemed a single entity266 give rise to a conclusion that the 
Supreme Court considered that issue on the merits. Because 
Radovich was decided at the pleading stage (unlike the Oakland 
Raiders and NASL opinions, which were written after full eviden-
tiary hearings), the Court did not have before it a sufficient factual 
record to enable it to determine as a matter of law whether the NFL 
was a single entity. Therefore, the Second Circuit's reliance on 
Radovich was misplaced. 
After improperly relying on Radovich to find that the NFL's 
teams constituted multiple entities, the Second Circuit devoted the 
remainder of its opinion to explaining why the cross-ownership ban 
constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade. First, the Second Cir-
cuit decided that the purpose of the cross-ownership ban was to 
damage the NASL by restricting its access to sports-ownership capi-
tal.267 Next, the court determined that sports-ownership capital was 
not fungible with all other capital and is in limited supply.268 The 
net result, in effect, was a conclusion that the NFL violated the Sher-
man Act by attempting to monopolize the sports-ownership-capital 
market. The problem with this conclusion is that attempting to mo-
nopolize a market is a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, not 
263. 352 U.S. at 446-47. 
264. 352 U.S. at 454. 
265. 352 U.S. at 453. 
266. Brief For Respondents at 53-56, Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 
(1957). 
267. 670 F.2d at 1257. 
268. 670 F.2d at 1260. As Justice Rehnquist pointed out, in reaching these conclusions the 
Second Circuit usurped the role of the trial court by making factual determinations. See 
NASL, 103 S. Ct. 499, 500 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
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a violation of section 1. , Only a section 1 violation was alleged in the 
case. To prove a violation of section 2, a plaintiff must show that the 
defendant possessed monopoly power, but such market power need 
not be proved in a section 1 action.269 Presumably, the NASL did 
not allege a section. 2 violation because it knew that it could not 
prove that the NFL possessed the market power needed to effectively 
restrict access to the sports-ownership capital market. Consequently, 
the Second Circuit, by improperly finding multiple actors, enabled 
the NASL to bring a successful section 2 action under the guise of 
section 1 when it was unable to prove all the elements required for a 
section 2 violation. 
To fit the cross-ownership ban into the framework of section 1, 
the Second Circuit had to find that the ban unreasonably restrained 
trade. The Second Circuit acknowledged the NFL's contention 
"that the ban assures it of the undivided loyalty of its team owners in 
competing effectively against the NASL."270 Thus, the court recog-
nized that the ban was in effect a covenant between NFL team own-
ers not to compete with the NFL through ownership of a team in 
another sports league. However, the court continued as follows: 
We do not question the importance of obtaining the loyalty of partners 
in promoting a common business venture, even if this may have some 
anticompetitive effect. But in the undisputed circumstances here the 
enormous financial success of the NFL league despite long-existing 
cross-ownership by some members of NASL teams demonstrates that 
there is no market necessity or threat of disloyalty by cross-owners 
which would justify the ban. Moreover, the NFL was required to 
come forward with proof that any legitimate purposes could not be 
achieved through less restrictive means. This it has failed to do.271 
The flaws in this statement are at least two-fold. First, the record 
does not justify the statement that the continued :financial success of 
the NFL demonstrates that there is no need for the ban. Second, this 
statement implies that once a business is successful, it is illegal for it 
to try to operate even more efficiently or to try to correct any flaws in 
its system of operations. 
The record suggests that Lamar Hunt, who owned both the 
NASL Dallas Tornados and the NFL Kansas City Chiefs, visited 
Philadelphia and Minnesota, where both NASL and NFL teams 
were located. While there, he attempted to arouse fan interest in the 
269. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). 
270. 670 F.2d at 1261. 
271. 670 F.2d at 1261. 
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NASL teams at the expense of fan interest in the NFL teams,272 
thereby acting to the detriment of the NFL as a whole. The record 
also suggests that Joe Robbie, who owned the NFL Miami Dolphins 
and whose wife owned the NASL Fort Lauderdale Strikers, "di-
verted resources of the NFL Miami Dolphins to the NASL Fort 
Lauderdale Strikers, thereby lessening or threatening to lessen the 
effectiveness of the Dolphins' contribution to the NFL."273 The rec-
ord further describes other potential sources of conflict that the 
cross-ownership ban would have avoided.274 
By striking' down the cross-ownership ban, the NASL court in 
effect held that the NFL's :financial success not only precluded it 
from acting to protect itself from a competitor's activities, but also 
required it to aid that competitor in its effort to compete. Such a 
holding is contrary to accepted antitrust policy and to the law in the 
Second Circuit.275 It forces the NFL to accept inefficient operations, 
and it protects small competitors rather than enhancing competition. 
Furthermore, the court stated: "[T]he NFL was required to come 
forward with proof that any legitimate purposes could not be 
achieved through less restrictive means."276 However, less restrictive 
alternatives may not have appeared to be as efficient to administer. 
In hindsight, one can always imagine an alternative that would have 
272. NFL Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 50, NASL, 
505 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), revd, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 499 
(1982) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
273. Id. at 74. 
274. Id. at 69-75. 
275. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 1093 (1980) involved an antitrust action by Berkey, a producer of amateur cameras 
with a small share of the market, against Kodak, a company with monopoly power in the 
manufacture of both amateur cameras and film. See 603 F.2d at 269-70. Berkey did not 
produce film. See 603 F.2d at 267. Kodak simultaneously marketed a new model camera and 
a new high-quality film that fit only its new camera (the "110 system"). As a result, consumers 
desiring to use the new film could not use a competitor's camera until competing camera man-
ufacturers (such as Berkey) developed cameras that could use the new Kodak film. See 603 
F.2d at 276-79. The district court instructed the jury that if Kodak had monopoly power in 
cameras or film so that another camera manufacturer could not compete with Kodak in the 
camera market unless its products were similar to Kodak's, Kodak's failure to predisclose de-
tails of the new 110 system to competitors could constitute a violation of Sherman Act§ 2. 603 
F.2d at 281. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that Kodak did not have a duty to predis-
close what it was developing. The court noted that "a monopolist is permitted, and indeed 
encouraged, by§ 2 to compete aggressively on the merits," 603 F.2d at 281, and that "any 
success that it may achieve through 'the process of invention and innovation' is clearly toler-
ated by the antitrust laws." 603 F.2d at 281 (citation omitted). To require a monopolist to 
disclose its plan so that competitors could introduce similar competing products at the same 
time would stifle innovation. 603 F.2d at 281-82. Berkey Photo thus clearly stands for the 
proposition that a monopolist cannot be forced to aid its competitors simply because it has a 
monopoly. The NASL opinion, which in effect required the NFL to assist its competitor, the 
North American Soccer League, cannot be reconciled with Berkey Photo. 
276. 670 F.2d at 1261. 
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been less restrictive than the one chosen. However, if that alterna-
tive appears less efficient to administer, imposing it upon a party 
may lead to inefficient results, which waste resources and encumber 
efforts to achieve the elusive goal of Pareto optimality. 
Because the cross-ownership ban was a covenant to preclude 
partners in a partnership from competing against the partnership, it 
should have been upheld as a legitimate ancillary restraint. In the 
words of Judge (later Chief Justice) Taft: "Restrictions in the arti-
cles of partnership upon the business activity of the members, with a 
view of securing their entire effort in the common enterprise, [are], of 
course, only ancillary to the main end of the union, and [are] to be 
encouraged."277 
CONCLUSION 
In recent years the Supreme Court has moved closer and closer to 
recognizing that consumer wealth maximization should be the sole 
goal underlying antitrust enforcement policy. Part of this movement 
involves the recognition that economic realities must be examined 
and considered in fashioning an objective standard for antitrust en-
forcement. Recognition of economic realities must preclude courts 
from finding multiple actors for purposes of Sherman Act § 1 simply 
because separately organized businesses may be acting in concert. 
Before finding multiple entities for purposes of section 1, a court 
should, at the very least, carefully examine all of the facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding the operation of the purported combination 
and challenged practice. A court should also examine the ultimate 
ramifications of any conclusions derived. The failure to engage in 
such examination in many sports law cases, and most particularly in 
the Oakland Raiders and NASL cases, has resulted in decisions that 
only thwart legitimate attempts by the NFL and other professional 
sports leagues to operate efficiently. These decisions are inconsistent 
with the emerging realization that consumer wealth maximization is 
the only proper goal of antitrust enforcement policy. 
277. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898), mod!fied, 
175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
